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I i
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY i
In the Matter of the Arbitration
;between
Motion Picture Laboratories Film
Technicians. Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
Award
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
. accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The proper rate for the Bell & Howell panel printer
shall be 30c above the 3roup_5_rate when the machine is operated at a speed of over 180 and up to
and_including 240 feet per minute. Eligible etnploy•ees shall be so paid retroactively for the period of
time that the machine has run under that condition.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

T

Eric J^Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: January
< 1970
STATE OF New York
)as.:
COUNTY OF Hew York
)
'

-tDn this /13 day of January, 1970, before me personally canc>
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged_to Jie-thafhe executed the sane.

I
:

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratories Film
Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.
As Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the above named parties, the following stipulated issue was submitted to me for determination:
What is the proper rate for the Bell & Howell
panel printers?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on December 22,
1969 at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract time
limit for the rendition of the Award.
After a review of the entire record 1 conclude, consistent with ay oral observations at the conclusion of the hearing, that under Section 17(c) of the contract Duavt is obliged
to pay the same base wa gs rate for the operation of this machine as the Union previously negotiated at other laboratories
under the same contract, namely 30c above the Group 5 rate
when the machine is run at a speed over 180 and up to and including 240 feet a minute.
There is no dispute that the Bell. & Howell panel printer
, Is 'View equipment" within the meaning of Section 17(c) of the
contract.

There is also no dispute that the same equipment

- 2Is in operation at certain other laboratories under thle contract, and that subsequent to the effective date of the contract the Union negotiated the aforementioned rate of pay
for the operation of this machine at those other laboratories.
With these factors undisputed I find that Section 17(c)
of the contract mandates the same wage rate for the same operation of the machine at DuArt.
of Section 17(c) to be clear.

I find the meaning and intent
When a piece of new equipment

is installed the parties are to negotiate the wages and conditions with respect thereto.

Falling to agree within the

specified period of time, unresolved questions of wages and/
or conditions may be referred to the Arbitrator.

But if the

same equipment either existed in other laboratories under
this contract when the contract was entered into, or installed in other laboratories "hereafter" (or in other worde during the term of this contract), any bate wage rate agreed to
by the Onion and that Employer is thereafter applicable to
all other employers under the contract who subsequently, during the term of this contract, install the same new equipment
in their laboratories.
The facts in the Instant case square precisely with the
circumstances covered by Section 17(c) of the contract. After

V

the effective date of the current agreement, this type of
7
7
equipment was installed at Movielab, DeLuxe, VP1 and other
labs. And the Union negotiated a rate of 30c above the
Group 5 rate when the machine ran aX a speed over 180 and up
to and including 240 feet a minute.

Subsequently, the same

new equipment, to be run at the same speed, was installed at

- 3DuArt, giving rise to the instant dispute. Consequently I can
reach no conclusion other than that DuArt must pay the same
rate as the others.
I am persuaded that my conclusions in this case are In
accord with the purpose and intent for which a master Collcct! ive Bargaining Agreement was negotiated.

I am satisfied that

the single contract, applicable equally to all covered Employers, was intended to insure uniformity of conditions, wages
and practices between and amongst the Union and those employers.

Distinctions, if any, are set forth expressly within

that Agreement.

But Section 17(c) clearly applies to all. And

It does so I believe, in order to insure that the rate of pay
for new equipment, operating in the same manner, should be
•

, the same throughout the Industry, BO that no laboratory can ob!

tain an unfair competitive advantage or Indeed be placed at a
competitive disadvantage with regard to wages oaid for the
same work.

Eric J/Schxertz
Permanent Arbitrator

- —

-•-

I

•

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTIOK PICTURE FILM LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitratoi", having been designate:1 in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement enterec into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs anc
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Because there is no present contract provision
granting uniforms to the affected employees and
because I do not find that the policy of BerkeyPatb.4 to grant such uniforms was a negotiated
benefit with the Union, Movielab, as the successor to Berkey-Pathi need not continue suoplying
those uniforms.
The Arbitrator's fee and hearing room expense
shall be borne by the Union.

< • »-„ ^c-'
Eric J. Schaertz
/
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: March ]/ 1970
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this
day of March, 1970, before me personally cane
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that ft- executed the same.

Case No. 69A-24

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
i
i
i
t

and
Movielab, Inc.

Opinion

The stipulated issue is;
Are certain employees entitled to uniforms at
Movielab East?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on February 16, 1970 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath

wae waived as was the contract time limit for rendition o.
the Arbitrator's Award.
The Company acquired Movielab East at the end of June,
1969.

The predecessor owner, Berkey-Pathe, had supplied cer-

tain types of uniforms to certain employees (negative workers,
developers, expediters, chemists and tnaintenanc- men). BerkeyPathi bore the entire cost of those uniforms including cleaning.
Some time after acquisition, the Company decided to discontinue supplying those uniforms and posted a notice to that
effect on August 28, 1969.

The Union complained, and the

parties agreed to maintain the "status quo" pending this
arbitration.
The Union contends that the Company, as the successor to

Berkey-Path£ Is obligated to continue the benefit of free uniforms to those certain employees.

It further asserts that the

plan to supply uniforms was bilaterally negotiated by the
Union and Berkey-Pathe, to which the Company (Movielab) as the
successor to Berkey-Path£ is bound.

And finally the Union

argues that continuing to supply the free unifor *.s during the
months of July and August after the Company acquired the installation, constituted a ratification of that arrangement
which the Company may not now avoid.
If the evidence persuaded me that the free uniform program was in fact a bilaterally negotiated benefit between the
Union and Berkey-Pathl subsequent to the effective date of the
present contract, I would sustain the Union's oosition and
find the Company obligated to continue that benefit.
am not so persuaded.

But I

The Collective Bargaining relationsulp

between the Union and Berkey-Path£ was under the same industrywide contract as then obtained and nov obtains to the Union
and the Company.

Based on my experience with the parties to

that industry wide agreement, I believe that benefits bilaterally negotiated subsequent to the effect date o^ the contract,
especially i.i case of such a significant benefit as uniforms,
would have been reduced to writing, at least in stipulation
or memorandum form.

This is not to say that a subsequent oral

agreement cannot add to or modify the written contract. Rather,
I am convinced that in connection with free uniforms, the
Union and Berkey-Pathe would not have consummated an agreement
on such a benefit in so casual and informal way.

- 3In this regard I do not dispute Mr. Vitello's testimony.
There is no doubt that he, on behalf of the Union, urged
Berkey-Path£ to supply uniforms for certain employees.

But I

am convinced that Berkey-Pathe's decision to supoly uniforms,
though prompted by the Union's request, was unilaterally made
and in the nature of a grant rather than as a result of a
bargain struck with the Union.

The Union may well have con-

cluded that the grant of uniforms constituted a negotiated benefit.

But based on the evidence and circumstances before me

I cannot endow the arrangements with that status.
It is clear that the Union gave no contractual consideration for the uniforms nor apparently was there any other discernible quid pro quo.

This is not to say that what Berkey-

Path4 did was not wise and conducive to improved productivity
or morale, but only that the adoption of a Union request or
suggestion, absent any give and take in the classic bargaining
sense, and where unrecorded in stipulation or memorandum forte,
does not reach the level of a negotiated benefit to which
either the predecessor employer or the successor company is
bound.
I agree with the Company that even during the BerkeyPath£ administration,

the supplying of the free uniforms had

not continued for such a long and uninterrupted period as to
become an implied contract benefit.
Union's theory of ratification.

Nor can I accept the

It seems to me that a success-

or employer is entitled to a reasonable period of time to determine what changes and adjustments it wishes to make and

then to make them consistent with their rights and obligations.
Two months, from acquisition to the notice of discontinuing
the uniforms is not, in my judgment, beyond a reasonable period.
Accordingly, because there is no present contract provision granting uniforms to the affected employee ^ and because
I do not find that the policy of Berkey-Pathi to grant such
iniforms was a negotiated briefit with the Union, Movielab as
the successor to Berkey-Pathl need not continue supplying
those uniforms.

Eric 3/ Schmert^
Permanent Arbitrator

STATE OP NEW YORK t EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATE DIVISION OF ROMAN RIOIT3

X
STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN BIGHTS

.

I

on the complaint of
i

EOS TAGS BEOOES,
t

ORDER ON RBOPEHING

I

Case Ho. C-18239-69

Complainant,
- against s
MOV1ELAB, INC. and RON GABEL,
Chemical Analyst,

Respondents.
On April 23, 1969, a complaint was filed charging the above-named
respondents with unlawful discriminatory practices relating to employment.
On May 29, 1969, a determination was Issued after investigation
finding that there was no probable cause to believe that the respondents had
engaged in the said unlawful discriminatory practices.

The complainant has applied for reopening of the dismissal, which
is permitted pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Division of Human Rigttts.
After a review of file, I find that justice does not require that proceedings
before this Division be reopened.

The respondent company has produced a con- i

siderable volume of documentary evidence to substantiate its position that the
complainant was discharged because dt the quality of his work performance.
There is no evidence of discriminatory intent.
Therefore, pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Division of
Human Rights, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the application for reopening be denied.
Dated: Mew York., Mew York
March 17 1970
Robert J. Mandum
Comet•lionet 7
TOi Harlem Assertion of Rights, Inc.
2133 8th Avenue
New York, New York 10026
Mr. Eustace Heckles
P. 0. Box 801 Morn ingside Station
New York, New York 10026
Eric Rosenfeld, Xsq.
777 3rd Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Courtney E. Brown, Regional Manager
State Division of Hunan Right* '
62 East 125th Street
Mew York, New York

!

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians

'

Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

'
i
i
i
i
i

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
I find that prior to reconstruction of the takeup system on the dry end, the complement of the
#13 and #14 Black and White Positive Developing
Machine when operating two strands was five men.
Accordingly, the present complement shall be five
men.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April / 1970
STATE OF New York
)88 .
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this / day of April, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared E/ic J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 70A-2

r.' •' L
\RY ' ^ •
Nc

Tent, : > r

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

;

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DeLuxe General, Inc.
_______MH__~_____H___W^_«__M~.___^__^___
The stipulated issue is:
Shall there be a change in the present cotnoletnent
of the #13 and #14 Black and White Positive Developing Machines as a result of the reconstruction
of the take-up system on tt e dry end when operating two strands?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on February 18, 1970
at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract time
limit for rendition of the Award.

Both sides filed post hear-

ing briefs.
Because of the reconstruction of the take-up system on
the dry end, the parties agree that this case falls within
Section 17(c) of the contract.
However, as I see it, there is a subsidiary but threshold question about which the parties are in dispute.

And that

Is over what the complement on the disputed machine was prior
;to the reconstruction.

An answer to this threshold question

Will be determinative of the basic issue in dispute, simply beI!
Cause both sides argue that the present complement should be
o different from what it was prior to the reconstruction.

'

- 2 The Union claims that a crew of five men previously operated the machines when two strands were run.
asserts that the crew was four.

The Company

(At present, subsequent to

the reconstruction and pending the outcome of this case, the
crew in four.)
On these different premises the Union asserts that there
is nothing about the reconstruction which would justify a reduction in the crew complement from five to four; and the
Company argues that because the reconstruction simplified the
operation there is no reason why che complement should be increased from four (prior reconstruction), to five.
The weight of the evidence presented at the hearing, including testimony by Company witnesses, supports the Union's
claim that the crew complement prior to reconstruction was five
(two on the wet end; two on the dry end and a bridge-man for
relief.)

Therefore, since the positions of both sides in this

case rest on their respective but differing contentions regarding the prior crew complement, it follows that the present
crew complement on the machine in question, when operating two
strands, should be five.
Moreover, I am persuaded that a crew complement of five is
proper because, despite the thoroughly plausible contention of
the Company that the reconstruction simplified the mechanical
operation of the machines (though I was unable to make a comparison because the old take-up system has been abandoned and
abolished) I find no difference now, in the amount of time that
wet and dry operators require or are entitled to relief, from

V

- J those circumstances prior to reconstruction,

the same rest

breaks, meal periods and personal needs obtain as before, and
a fifth crew member is needed, in part at least to cover in
those situations.

In short, the reconstruction of the dry

end take-up system did not change the prior need for or use
of the bridge-man, whom I have found to have been the fifth
crew member prior to reconstruction.

Eric J/ Schmertz/
Permanent Arbitrator

'

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702. I.A.T.S.E.
Award
and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue Is:
What shall be the rate for the Hollywood Reduction Color Printing Machine?
Hearings were held at the Laboratory on January 12, 1970
and at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on
February 16, 1970, at which time representatives of the above
named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was waived as was the con-

tract time limit for the rendition of the Award. Both parties
filed post hearing briefs.
The machine in question Is admittedly "new" within the
•caning of Section 17(c) of the contract, and hence the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide the rate of pay.
For a number of reasons sat forth in its presentation and
briaf, the Onion contends that the operator of this machine is
entitled to 65$ an hour above the present contract Croup 5
rate. The Company's position is that the machine warrants no
more than the present Croup 5 rate for a color printer, namely $4.01 an hour.
Baaed on the entire record before me, together with my

- 2ob»erv*tlon of the operation of the machine in question; the
duties performed by the operator of that machine; and ay observation of other color printing machines in the Laboratory,
I aa not persuaded that the operation of the Hollywood Reduction Color Printing Machine and the duties of the operator in
connection therewith are significantly more complex, more demanding or of a more responsible nature than what is presently
expected of the operators of other color printing machines for
which the Croup 5 rate is paid.

Of course, because the machine

in question is new, It contains certain indigenous variations
and differences from other color printing machines.

But I am

not satisfied that these differences or variations are of a
magnitude to justify a higher rate of pay.
The Arbitrator's fee and the hearing room expense shall
be borne by the On 1cm.

•rlc J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April 71970
! STATE g lew fork
)SB.
COUNT? Or New York )

I

On this
/ day of April, 1970, before me personally earn*
and appeared fjfic J. Schatertx to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed die

H.U.. tf* '-> •>'•> »O
Nc. 3J-££-i<-5
Quill'iiC In NiiMt County
Tint Iffuti Mtrek U, 1WJ

., :---'.-;

''

, PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE

LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
Motion Picture Film Technicians

Award

and
Movielab, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was Ben Levine overpaid for the period week ending March 9, 1968 through week ending June 14,
1969? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on March 10, 1970
at which time Mr. Levine, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
Arbitrator's oath was waived as was the contract time limit
'' for rendition of the Award.

The Union filed a post hearing

brief.
Actually the parties are in dispute only over the second
question of the issue - namely the remedy.

It is clear that

the grievant was overpaid for the stipulated period of time.
As I see it, a non-negotiated or non-mutually agreed to
overpayment constitutes "unjust enrichmeg.t" for which recoupment is Justified. This is true even if the employer, as seems
to be the case here, was negligent in making the overpayment
and had at least one opportunity (when the contract rates were
increased) to correct it, but failed to do so. For even if
negligence be the reason, the grievant received more money than

- 2he was entitled to for the services he performed.
Accordingly I find that the Company is entitled to recoup
the overpayment in proportionate amounts from the grievant*s
pay, over a period of time not less than the approximately 15
months of the overpayment, unless he and the Union agree to a
shorter period of time.
I also direct that the grievant not suffer any financial
loss due to any increase in income tax he may have paid as a
result of the higher reported compensation during the period
of time that he was overpaid.

If, prospectively, his gross re-

ported compensation is reduced because of the recoupment deduction, it would appear that any excess tax he paid earlier would
thereby and in the future be offset. But if not, then the Company may recoup only an amount equal to the overpayment less any
net increase in taxes which the grievant paid as a result of that
overpayment.
Consistent with this Award I leave it to the parties to
i
I calculate the exact amount of the overpayment; to arrange the
method of repayment; and to work out the details concerning the

•

' tax question, if any. Any dispute on these matters shall be re-

;

1

ferred to me for resolution.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Union.

Eric J'. Schmertz /
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: April / 1970
STATE OF New York
)gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this / day of April, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me, that he, executed ,the same.
. Mil *>>•
!«:«' Uv :'f i.... i

n
\j
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
OFFICE OF THE G E N E R A L COUNSEL
Washington, D.C. 20570

April 20,

~70

1970

Re: Local 702, IATSE
(DeLuxe General, Inc.)
Case No. 2-CB-4799
Mr. Joseph DeMarco
1105 Korf itsen Road
New Mil ford, New Jersey 07646
Dear Mr. DeMarco:
Your appeal in the above matter has been duly considered.
The appeal is denied^ In view of the evidence that seniority was
by department and that you had the lowest seniority in the department where you were working when transferred to night work, it
could not be established that the Union had acted unreasonably
in considering that your grievance was without merit. Moreover,
the letter of April 11, 1970, from you indicated that you had
been returned to day work.
Very truly yours,
•

Arnold Ordman
General Counsel

By\g M«/Herman
Director, Office of Appeals
cc: Director, Region 2
Local 702, IATSE, 165 West 46th Street, New York, New York

10036

Pinto, Stein & Mozer, 270 Madison Avenue, New York, New York
10016, Attn: Robert Mozer
Poletti, Freidin, Prashker, Feldman & Gartner, 777 Third Avenue,
New York, New York 10017, Attn: Edward Medman, Esquire
CERTIFIED MAIL

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Hatter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
Award
and
Opinion

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Company required to pay negative rates for the
processing of the present type of Internegative film
such as Eastman Kodak 72-71 (16 mm) and 52-71 (35 mm),
and 72-70 (16 mm) and 52-70 (35 mm) on color positive developing machines?
A hearing was held at the Company on March 31, 1970 at
which time representatives of the Company and Union appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's oath and the contract time limit for the rendition of
the Award were waived.
Based on the record I conclude that In processing and use,
the present type of Internegative film referred to in the stipulated Issue has characteristics of both positive and negative
developing.
But this fact, which in my judgment makes it a film that
I squares exclusively with neither negative nor positive developing, points up the overriding fact that It is a film materially
unique unto itself.
Accordingly I can find no more basis for It to be treated
as negative developing, at the higher negative rate, than as

A
'-' '-' '

- 2part of the positive developing process, where it is presently located.
But based on "past practice" I shall leave it where I
find it, namely as part of the color positive developing machines at the regular rate of pay for those machines.

I do so

because this has been the practice for a number of years with
regard to this type of film, during which time contracts
were negotiated by the parties.

It seems to me that because

of the special characteristics of this type of film, a determination as to which rate of pay should obtain and where the
developing work is to be performed, should have been specially negotiated in those contracts, if its location, methods
of processing and pay were to be changed.
In other words I am satisfied that a change in what has
been a practice for a number of years of processing this
type of film on the color positive developing machines at the
color positive developing rate (which has required little or
no change in the technical methods or operations of those
machines from what is required to develop regular color positive prints) is a matter for negotiation between the parties
and not arbitration.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, having duly heard the proofs and allegations of tha parties, renders the following Award:
The grievance is denied. The Company It not required to pay negative rates for the processing
of the present type of later-negative film such as
Eastman Kodak 72-71 (16 mm) and 52-71 (35 mm) and
72-70 (16 mm) and 52-70 (35 mm) on color positive
developing machines.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the, Union.
Eric J./Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

- 3DATED: May /<f-1970
STATE OF Hew York )86 .
COUNTY Of New York)
On this fa day of May, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE, AFL-CIO

and

Award
and
Opinion

Movlelab, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was there Just cause for the discharge of E. Jacobs,
F. IMO, M. Germaine, 6. Pizeolorusso, Jr., and R.
Kuklinski. (Messrs. M. Chylak and D. Scheurich were
also discharged but were subsequently granted Immunity.) If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on May 7, 1970 at which time the above
named employees, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants,"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appear
ed, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The parties expressly waived the contract time limit for rendition of
the Award, and each side filed a post hearing brief.
What I do not like about the Company's action is my conclusion that it imposed the penalty of discharge on the grievants not solely because they failed to satisfactorily cooperate in the Company's investigation of a potential incident of
Misconduct (presumably dangerous "horse play"), nor because it
suspected one or more of them of that misconduct, but rather,
in addition, as a device to induce them to admit their own
guilt or to implicate others.
Arbitrations are not criminal proceedings and the "privilege against self incrimlnation" Is not technically applicable

1

I
Yet somewhere between the Company's right to investigate an
Incident which it believes to be dangerous and improper, and
the right of an employee to job security unless Just cause for
discharge is shown, are found certain fundamental concepts of
due process, which do obtain in matters adjudicated in arbitration.
I see a distinction between an objective investigation of
an incident, in which the Company seeks information from employees either as witnesses or as the "source of knowledge," and
«n investigation in which the questioned employees are deemed
suspects of the alleged misconduct under investigation.

In the

latter situation - which I conclude was the circumstance involved in the instant case- the Company's right of investigation does not extend to the point where the employees face discharge or other severe penalties unless they admit their guilt
or implicate others.
In my judgment I consider it manifestly inconsistent with
fundamental due process for an employer to discharge or Indefinitely suspend an employee suspected of misconduct; when the
employer has no other independent probative evidence of the
employee's guilt; where the discharge or suspension is designed to induce if not compel the employee to provide answers
satisfactory to the Company regarding the alleged misconduct;
and where the only "satisfactory answer" is a statement by the
employee tantamount to an admission of his own guilt or that of
others.
In doing so the Company steps beyond the scope of the
right of investigation and the attendant duty of employees to

.-

I

I

•3 •
cooperate with that investigation, encroaching into a proscribed area reserved for certain basic protections accorded anyone
accused or suspected, whether in the employment relationship
or elsewhere. And it is my conclusion that that is what took
place here, whether the Company overtly intended it that way
or not.
The Company suspected that one or more of the grievants
had something to do with a broken coke bottle and the splattering of its contents on one of the grievants. It was not satisfied with the various explanations advanced by some of the
grievants; namely that they "did not know" or "did not see anything" or that "the bottle fell off the table," or no answer
at all.

It seems to me that if the Company thought the griev-

ants guilty of some offense in connection with that incident
it should have taken disciplinary action for that reason.

Or

if it disbelieved the grievants' explanations, it should have
disciplined them for that disbelief. Both actions of course,
would have been subject to the grievance procedure of the contract. But though the Company asserts that its action was
based on the latter (or in other words on the "failure or refusal of the grievants to cooperate in the Company's investigation"), I am persuaded that it went significantly beyond
that point. That the grievants were treated as suspects cannot seriously be disputed.

(Immunity is granted to either a

suspect or one who might incriminate himself - end Immunity
was granted two of the grievants, situated similarly with the
others, at the arbitration hearing.) Also, the Company's
claim that the grievants did not cooperate is questionable.

- 4The fact is that they or spokesmen on their behalf answered
the Company's inquiry as to what happened.
The "lack of cooperation" is based on the Company's determination that those answers were either untrue or incomplete.
It appears therefore that "satisfactory cooperation" is equated by the Company only with answers that the Company deems
satisfactory. I am not sure that the Company is the sole judge
of the meaning and standard of "cooperation." But that need
when
not be decided because the Company went further. I believe/it
decided the grievants' answers were unsatisfactory, it imposed
the penalty of discharge not just for that reason, but also as
a device to induce the grievants to supply different answers
which, in the judgment of the Company, would be either more
complete or more accurate. And it is this latter purpose and
procedure which I find improper and objectionable.
Let me explain what I think to be the absence of fundamental due process. The grievants were discharged, in part at
least, for refusing to tell on themselves (or on others situated similarly);and if they had purged themselves of that refusal, they or others they implicated would have been subject
to the same discipline as a result of the admission.
words the

In other

grievants could not escape the penalty of discharge

for failure to "cooperate with the Company's investigation"
without providing the Company with the only answer that it
deemed acceptable - an admission of culpability. Obviously that
would be no escape at all.
Also, in disciplinary matters the burden is on the employer to prove the misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.

i

- 5To me this means that the employer has the duty to collect
marshall and present evidence Independent of the statements of
the accused or suspected employee unless those statements are
voluntarily made or are admissions within a 'Voluntary context.'
I think it improper that the Company's case be based solely on
evidence or admissions out of the mouth of a suspected employee,
when such statements are obtained, apparently as the Company
attempted here, by penalizing the employee with discharge. To
my mind this simply does not meet the well settled burden on
the employer, to produce clear and convincing evidence of an
employee's misconduct.

Rather it is evidence of misconduct

produced by the employee himself, and involuntarily.
Indeed if the Company has no evidence independent of what
it obtains in this manner from a suspected employee, it simply
has no case for disciplinary action.

For it to attempt to con-

struct a case under those circumstances, by obtaining the evidence from the employees themselves under penalty of discharge,
or because that evidence was not forthcoming from them, is to
effectuate the very discipline which the Company otherwise, because of the absence of just cause, would not be able to sustain.
Contrary legal and arbitration citations, advanced by
the Company during the hearing and In Its brief, if not distinguishable from the facts in the instant case (and I think
the Company's analogy to the duty of a witness to testify has
been distinguished) are conclusions with which I simply do not
agree.

My research discloses a sufficient body of law and

arbitration cases in support of my view to assure me that what
_ I have sa'd ie by no means unique.

- 6Accordingly the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator tinder
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
-

parties, makes the following Award:
There was not just cause for the discharge of E. Jacobs,
F. Izzo, M. Germaine, G. Pizzolorusso, Jr. and R.
Kuklinski. As they have continued at work pending the
outsome of this arbitration, no remedy is necessary.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric Jv Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: August'1970
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) * "
/W
On this ' day of August, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case # 70A-Q3
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE, AFL-CIO
Award
and
Opinion

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.
The stipulated issue Is:

Was Anthony Caleca improperly reassigned? Was he
improperly reduced in his rate by 16c an hour?
If so what shall be the remedy in connection with
both questions?
Hearings were held at the Company offices on July 30 and
September 8, 1970 at which time Mr. Caleca, hereinafter referred to as the "grlevant," and representatives of the Company and Union appeared, and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition of the Award were waived.
I find nothing In the contract which prohibits the Company from changing an employee's duties or assigning him from
one set of duties to another within the same job classification.
I find that the work whiih the grievant performed first In
the Finishing Department; then on the VPI account; and after
his removal from the VPI account, all fell within the Checker
B job classification. So I find nothing contractually Improper about his involuntary transfer from the VPI account to

i

0

-2other work within the same classification.
It Is undisputed that while on the VPI account the grlevant received 16c an hour above the Checker B rate, and that
this Increase In pay vas unilaterally granted by the Company
because of the Importance which It attached to that account.
The additional 16e an hour was not an increase Jointly negotiated by the Company and the Union.

Therefore, as a bonus

attached to that particular job, unilaterally by the Company,
I see no reason why the Company could not delete It from an
employee's pay when the employee no longer worked on Che VPI
account, provided the affected employee continued to receive
at least the contractual Checker B rate for other work to
which he was assigned in that classification.
And that was the situation here. While the grievant
worked on the VPI account he enjoyed the higher rate of pay
unilaterally granted by the Company.

When he was reassigned

to other duties within the Checker B classification, the Company reduced his pay by 16e an hour, but continued to pay him
at the Checker B rate.
Had the additional 16$ an hour been jointly negotiated
by the parties, it would then have assumed the status of a
contract rate and the affected employee would have enjoyed the
protection of Section 4 Paragraph (c) of the contract. But
because I find that Section of the contract applicable to contract rates or rates negotiated or mutually agreed to by the
parties, the additional 16c an hour involved in the instant
case is not "wages over the prior base rate" within the meaning of that Section.

Accordingly the grievant1s reduction In

i

- 3pay by 16$ an hour was not improper.

i
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collect-

ive Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following AWARD:
Anthony Caleca was not improperly reassigned nor
was he improperly reduced in rate by 16e an hour.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Union.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

X
DATED: October
1970
STATE OF New York ) ,
COUNTY OF New York) * "

X
On this 3 day of October, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
ae to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case Mo. 70A-8

i
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October 8, 1970

In the course of the Arbitration hearing in Case #70A-7
between De Luxe General, Inc and Local 702, I.A.T.S.E. the '
permanent Arbitrator issued the following directive;
When the company makes a transfer under Article 13
of the contract, the employee so £»d-t<i>'ated must
perform the assignment even if he or the Union
beleives that the assignment and the transfer is
in violation of the contract or any other
agreement between the Union and the Company.
The right of the employee and or the Union
is under the grievance'procedure of the contract.
In other words, the employee must perform the work
assigned subject to his right and the right
of the Union on his behalf to complain to
the permanent Arbitrator subsequent to performing
the assignment that it is in violation of the
contract, and to seek whatever remedy or relief
would be appropriate.
The intent of this directive is to make clear
to the parties that the permanent Arbitrator
believes that work assigned nust be performed
by the employee so assigned whether or not
in violation of the contract subject to his
right to thereafter grieve before the permanent
Arbitrator.
The only exception to this worj€^se"u-tleitren t is
when the assignment would place the employee
in physical jeopardy or when the ^assignment is
illegal or unsocial.

,
"' "

Eric J Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

7
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
'between
De Luxe General Incorporated
and

FINDINGS AND AWARD
CASE #7AQ4

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties makes the
following FINDINGS and AWARD
1. On November 17, 1970 a dispute arose over the manning
of the striping machine and the performance of striping work. As a consequence, and one orders of the Union,
the Developers in the Developing Department interrupted
regular production and engaged in a work stoppage within the meaning and proscription of Section 15(h) of the
contract, by putting up "leader" on the Developing
machines. This violated Section 15(h) of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
2. The Union must bear responsibility for placing the
Developers in a position which caused their suspension
by the Company. Therefore the Union is responsible for
the duration of time between the beginning of the stoppage
and the employees' return to productive work—approximately two hours. The Union's defense of "lockout" is rejected. The Company is entitled to receive from the Union,
as ordinary damages, the amount of wages paid and welfare
and pension benefits credited to the Developers during
that period of time. Accordingly the Union shall pay the
Company the sum of three hundred dollars and fifty-four
cents ($300.54).
3. I am not persuaded that the expenses incurred by the
Company in shipping striping work to the West Coast and
receiving it back was an inexorable consequence of that
stoppage. While I understand the Company's decision
as a matter of prudence, in view of my rulings at the
first hearing I cannot conclude that the handling of
striping work at the Company would again have been
interrupted or refused by the employees or the Union.
Therefore the Company's claim for money damages arising
from its decision to have striping work done on the
West Coast, is denied.

-24. Pending the final determination of any dispute between
the parties, including disputes arising from the temporary transfer clause, other contract provisions, oral
agreements, and the meaning and application or alleged
breaches of the "status quo" of Section 15(h), the
Union and the employees may not engage in strikes, slowdowns, work stoppages, cessations of work or other interferences with normal production during the life of this
contract. Section 15(h) expressly forbids such action.
Even a breach of the "status quo" by the Company does
not justify such action. And therefore I need not determine in this proceeding whether there was such a breach.
The proper procedure in the case of any dispute is to
process a claim through the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract. The arbitration forum is
fully adequate to fashion appropriate remedies and orders
in the event of any violations.
5. Therefore as a response to a dispute during the life of
this collective agreement, a strike, or any action which
falls within that definition by the Union and/or the
employees, just as is a "lockout" by the Company, is
totally unnecessary as well as prohibited by the contract
and this AWARD. Also, pending the determination of any
dispute under the procedures of Section 15, the parties
are required to maintain the "working conditions or
methods of operation as they existed prior to the dispute
except as they may be otherwise permitted by .(the)
Agreement". Henceforth, in the adjustment of disputes,
the parties shall follow and comply with the provisions
of Section 15 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6. The Arbitrator's fee totalling $600.00 shall be borne
2/3rds by the Union ($400} and l/3rd by the Company
($200).

Eric J/" Schmertz
/
Permanent Arbitratoir
DATED: December 14th, 1970
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York) ~'
On this fourteenth day of December 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

t
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE F.luM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
DeLuxe General Incorporated
/'
and

FINDINGS
CASE I#70AQ5

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

The Undersigned, as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective;
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, makes the
following FINDINGS and AWARD:
\. In virtually all instances, vacancies which the Company

/

decides to fill in the skilled classifications are
filled by employees referred to the Company by the
Union; or are filled from other sources after the
Union has been asked to refer candidates and is unable to do so because none with that skill are on
layoff or available.
2. The foregoing has represented a realistic business
judgement by the Company and a procedure in furtherance
of sound labor relations. For both reasons I recommend
it be continued wherever possible.
3. However I do not find that the Company is required to
follow the foregoing procedure under the Contract. The
two Sections upon which the Union relies are not applicable. The effectiveness of the pertinent part of Section
l(e) awaits the happening of a condition precedent. And
under the facts in the instant case Section 25 does not
bind the Company to the provisions of Article 27 Section
l(a) of the Union's By-Laws. Therefore, the hiring of
Mr. F_. Giovanelli by the Company is not and would not
~be violative of the Collective Agreement.
4. There is evidence that the Union committed two ad hoc and
temporary violations of my AWARD of December 14, 1970 in
case #70AQ4, and threatened one additional violation.
I reiterate that AWARD, and as stated therein, direct
compliar.ee for the balance of the Collective Bargaining
penalties in this case because I have not previously
given notice ;hat such remedies vo-ild be applicable.
Rather I shall T.ake use cf this case to serve notice that
as Permanenc Arbitrator I expect .r.y orders and Awards to
be strictl\. Willful failures or refusals to
do so wll r^aveafter bo subit':t to c'r^-jic-;;

-

-

-

-v-'^e-r^T'.f

-25.

/

Much of this case including a ruling on the "status
quo" is in the nature of a Declaratory Judgement.
Accordingly the Arbitrator's total fee of four
hundred and fifty dollars ($450.) shall be shared
equally by the parties.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: December 28th, 1970
STATE OF New York ) ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty eighth day of December 1970, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

• V--A
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
Award and
Opinion

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:

Was the transfer of Philip Lamendola from negative
to positive developing a violation of his seniority
rights? If so what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on March 18, 1971,
at which time Mr. Lamendola, hereinafter referred to as the

!

"grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and

i
Company appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
This proceeding is in the nature of a "declaratory judgmerit" to determine which of two employees, the grievant or

i
|
t

Robert Twilley (who was also present at the hearing) is entitled to a single available negative developing job.
The answer turns on whether Twilley, who concededly had
more seniority than the grievant as a negative developer,
abandoned or relinquished that seniority.

I conclude he did

not.
While working as a negative developer Twilley became ill
and underwent a serious operation.

Upon his return to work,

at his request, and in apparent recognition of his need for a

- 2period of recuperation, he was permitted to work at the less
demanding task of positive developing, though he retained his
negative developing classification and the higher rate of pay
of that classification. This arrangement was agreed to by the
Union and Company and confirmed in a letter dated April 22,
1969 from Mr. Quigley to Mr. Vitello. Though that letter states
that Twilley "will return to negative developing when the first
opening occurs," I am satisfied the parties intended to allow
him to remain in positive developing until his health permitted
him to return to the more difficult negative developing work.
Therefore unless it can be established that Twilley was physically capable of assuming the negative developing job on a full
time basis when first, one, and then a second job opening for
that classification was posted, his failure to bid in each instance cannot be deemed prejudicial to his seniority rights as
a negative developer.
The evidence in the record does not support a conclusion
that at the time those two openings were posted the grievant
had sufficiently recovered from his illness to resume work in
that classification on a full time basis. It is undisputed
that at that time, and at the request of the Company he did
perform assignments as a negative developer, on a straight
time and overtime basis, and he concedes also that he worked

I
occasional "double shifts." But he also testified, without refuI
tation, that it was very difficult physically for him to do so;
that he was not fully able to perform that work on a regular
continuing basis; and that he did it out of a sence of obligation to the Company because it had allowed him to retain his

- 3negative developing classification and rate of pay while working as a positive developer during his recuperation.

I find no

reason why his explanation and characterization of his physical
condition at the time he willingly undertook negative developing
assignments, should not be believed and accepted.
Also, though I appreciate the grievant's equitable argument
that he should not have been removed from negative developing to!
make room for Twilley after the latter passed up two posted
openings in that classification, I find no contractual reason
why Twilley was obliged to either bid for those openings or

I
j

claim those jobs in order to keep his seniority as a negative
I

developer. While Twilley worked as a positive developer, he rei
tained the negative developing classification and the higher
rate.

So there was no need for him to seek a classification or

rate of pay which he already enjoyed.

Also it is undisputed

that Job postings are promotional in nature - from a lower to a
higher classification, rather than to a specific job opening.
So, put another way, because Twilley remained classified at the
higher negative developing level there was no "promotion" for

•
I

j
j

him to seek or claim.
This is not to say that an employee, ready and able to
assume regular work in a higher classification to which his
seniority attaches, cannot abandon his seniority rights to
that position by failing to claim Job openings when they occur, j
Rather it is that I do not find that the particular facts in
this case can be interpreted to have reached that point.
Accordingly, the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator un-

I

der the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:

i

Because Robert Twilley had neither abandoned nor
waived his seniority rights as a negative developer, the transfer of Philip Lamendola from negative to positive developing was not a violation
of Mr. Lamendola's seniority rights.

j
\e Arbi

the parties.

Eric T. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April 12, 1971
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

j
.

j

On this 12th day of April, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual desxribed in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Cas No. 70 A-13
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
, Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
'Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
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•*
and
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Award and
Opinion

"beLuxe General, Inc.*'
The stipulated Issue Is;
. Was the layoff of Louis D'Agostino In violation of
his seniority rights? If so what shall be the remA hearing was held at the Laboratory on May 28, 1971 at
which time Mr. D'Agostino. hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The Union does not dispute the economic need for layoffs
in the Raw Stock Department.

It contends however, that be-

, fore the layoff reached the grievant, the "101 Foreman" Mr.
Lorenzano, who had less departmental seniority than the grievant,

should have been laid off.

w

The question is whether the "101 Foreman" is to be In-

cluded for layoff purposes, with the "rank and file" as part
of the same job classification within the meaning of Section 7
(1) pf the contract; or rather, whether the "101 Foreman" is
a different classification from In this Instance, Raw Stock

•

o
- 2-

clerk, and subject to layoff only within the Foreman category
irrespective of the layoffs and seniority of Raw Stock Clerks.
I find a contractual presumption in favor of treating the
"101 Foreman" as part of the Raw Stock Clerk classification
for purposes of layoffs.

Schedule A of the contract is entit-

led "Classifications of Work and Rates."

No where in that
i

schedule is the "101 Foreman" or the Working Foreman or the

Sub-Foreman listed as a classification. The Raw Stock Department enumerates only Raw Stock Clerks, Raw Stock Handlers and
Read Raw Stock Receiver (the latter two not involved in the
instant dispute.) In short. Schedule A which contractually
enumerates two job classlciatlons, does not Include the Foreman
job assignment.

Accordingly Section 16 of the contract, parti-

cularly Section 16 (e) cannot be construed as establishing the
Foreman assignment as a job classification.

Instead, I am sat-

isfied that its purpose and intent is limited to fixing a pay
premium of 101 above the existing classification, for performance of certain supervisory duties.

I Interpret it to mean

that the supervisory job assignment carries a 101 premium above
the highest base rate ef the classification of the affected
employee.

In other words, narrowed to the instant dispute, the

"101 Foreman" is paid the highest base rate of his classification
plus 101 for performing certain supervisory work; but he remains classified pursuant to that base rate, namely as a Raw
Stock Clerk.
'••-

The intent and spirit of the relationship between the

"101 Foreman" and the "rank and file" in sharing the available
vork is found, I believe, In Section 9, though it relates spec-

- ..-.

••f'Sf-r-.

I

-
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ifically to sharing overtime.

In substance that Section pre-

cludes either » preference or disadvantage to the Foreman in
the allocation of overtime work; permitting him to participate
in

regular departmental overtime on precisely the same basis

as the rank and file. To my mind that means not only that
nor
contractually there may be neither a preference for/a restraint
on the Foreman's entitlement to the extra available work together with the "rank and file" in his department, but that
implicitly and reciprocally no preference should be accorded
the Foreman if the available work falls below a full regular
quantity.

Sat contrary to this intent, a Foreman would enjoy

such a proscribed preference, if though junior in seniority,
be is retained in a layoff situation and thereby continues at
work while others within the rank and file who enjoy greater
departmental seniority, are laid off.
Finally I consider it significant that the "101 Foreman"
is within the bargaining unit and covered by this Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Though undisputedly he performs

certain '••
i
supervisory functions (like a group leader or leadman) he cani
aot be considered a managerial supervisor because he Is not en- !
!
compassed within the managerial ranks. The Company's argument
i
In this case, that the Foreman must be retained or dealt with j
i
separately in layoff situations because of the essentiality of
i
his supervisory assignment, and because his layoff might paralyzfe
the work of the department, endows these bargaining unit Fore- |
i
men with the kind of supervisory authority ordinarily attached
to managerial supervisors who are excluded from the bargaining
unit for that very reason. Absent proof in this area, I am not

'-4-

J

persuaded that the "10% Foreman" who Is covered by this Collective Bargaining Agreement as part of the bargaining unit enjoys
that level of Importance or authority. Also I think the Company exaggerates the Impact of a ruling favorable to the Union
In this case.

It suggests that a determination which combines

the "101 Foreman" with the rank and file for purposes of layoff
would cripple Its ability to operate the various departments

i
Involved.

The fact however, Is that the circumstances In the

t
Instant dispute are unique.

Both sides recognize that In the

j

overwhelming number of situations the "101 Foreman" is an employee with the highest seniority in the department, and there'
fore under any theory, not reachable in a layoff unless the

i

less senior rank and file employees of the department have been
laid off first.

So as a practical matter, the concern express- i

ed by the Company la most unlikely to develop.
The evidence on Industry practice and the practices of
this Company do not change the foregoing.

Uncontroverted is

j
j
!

the Union's testimony that elsewhere in the Industry, involving
Bnployers covered by this same master Agreement, departmental

|
j

layoffs Include the working Foreman and the rank and file as a
group within the same classification.

So apparently, absent

j
evidence to the contrary, other employers faced with the same
adverse economic conditions, have managed to maintain the re-

I
j

maining production even where a "101 Foreman" junior to employees In the "rank and file" is laid off.
The evidence advanced by the Company In connection with

i
i

its practice is neither sufficiently extensive nor sufficiently

i
comparable to the Instant dispute to be controlling.

I cannot

€

»
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consider only two prior layoffs (in the Developing Department
and in the Printing Department) to be of the quantity or con•latency required to establish a "past practice."

i

Also It

appears that in the layoffs in these two departments, though
affecting the rank and file first, and the foremen later (i.e. as
i
separate groups) the foreman involved possessed higher seniority than any of the others first laid off, Hence under the
Union's theory in the Instant case, those layoffs were and would
not be objectionable to the Onion. And therefore the Union's
failure to grieve in those instances cannot be deemed prejudicial to the Onion's position here. Instead, as I previously indicated, the facts in the instant case are unique; indeed the
first time that the problem has arisen.

j

!

Here, as distinguished

I

from any other prior departmental layoff, the "101 Foremen"

ii

just happened to be junior in the seniority to the rank and file
Raw Stock Clerks; hence for the first time, in an unusual cir-

j

cumstance, the problem arose and the grievance was filed.
For all the foregoing reasons I am persuaded of a contractual presumption in favor of treating the "10% Foreman" in the

i
i

Raw Stock Department as part of the Raw Stock Clerk classification.

Consequently he should have been included amongst the

other Raw Stock Clerks for purposes of the layoffs which took
place on or about Friday, May 21, 1971 in accordance with
Section 7 (1) of the contract. As such, because his departmental seniority was less than that of the grievant's, his layoff
should have preceded the latter's, and because the layoff went
no further, the grievant would and therefore should not have

- 6been laid off at all.' Accordingly he shall be reinstated and
'made whole for the time lost.
'- ' ' As the Permanent Arbitrator in the Industry I wish to make
it clear that the presumption which I have fashioned in deciding this case, is Just that - a presumption.

It should not be

deemed irrebuttable. For example, though in this case I have

j

not been persuaded that the supervisory work of the "107. Fore- J
i
man" in the Haw Stock Department (where only one Stock Clerk
i
i
and one Foreman remain) mandates the retention of Mr. Lorenzano,i
I

there may be other situations where, based on evidence present-

i
ed, the retention of a foreman, albeit junior in seniority, is a

i
eompelling business necessity. In other words, the presumption
may be rebutted If the Foreman's supervisory function is essen- ;
tial and I am persuaded that there is no other bargaining unit

;
I

employee realistically and contractually able and willing to
assume the supervisor assignment, and/or no managerial supervisor similarly available.

Then the implicit right of the Com-

i

pany and its manifest need to continue the department at work

|
to meet remaining business needs, would negate the presumption

i
and allow the retention of the less senior foreman.

But this

exception to the presumption was not shown in the Instant case.
I do not know for example that the remaining senior Raw Stock
Clerk, Mr. Contino, lacks the ability or willingness to assume
Mr. Lorenzano*s supervisory assignments; or that other senior
employees elsewhere in the Laboratory are unqualified or unwilling to accept a transfer to that work; or that the managerlal supervisory force would be unable to cope with or absorb

- 7(

the supervisory vork In the event of Mr. Lorenzano'e layoff or

'•

his replacement by some other employee.

(This IB not to critlze ;
I
the Company's case herein. Obviously It could not know or an- I
•
.
I
ticlpat* the presumption on which I rely until the rendition of
this decision. )
Therefore I want the parties to clearly understand that the

I

contractual presumption involved In deciding the instant case
is not irrebuttable and therefore not absolutely controlling In
all departmental layoffs.

Instead it is a presumption favorable

to the Onion's argument that the Foreman and the rank and file
-

arc to be deemed within the same classification; but rebuttable
on a case by ease basis as indicated. For this reason I think

j
I

it fair and appropriate that the Arbitrator's fee in the Instant
case be shared equally by the parties.
Accordingly the Undersigned, as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and having heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following Award;
The layoff of Louis D'Agostino violated his seniority
rights. He shall be reinstated and made whole for theI
time lost.

For reasons stated in the Opinion the Arbitrator's fee
shall be shared equally by the parties.

Eric . Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: June 7, 1971
STATE OF New York )„ .
COUNTY OF »ew York)
On this 7th day of June, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described In and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same
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Titra Film Laboratories, Inc. and Clement Falzarano
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 of
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators
of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO and
Clement Falzarano. Cases 22-CA-4375 and
22-CB-1850
January 10, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
KENNEDY
On July 30, 1971, Trial Examiner Benjamin K.
Blackburn issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in
its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Trial Examiner: The charges
in these cases were filed on February 26 and served on
March 1, 1971. The complaint was issued on April 16. The
hearing was held on June 2 and 3 in Newark, New Jersey.
The issue is whether Titra, in violation of Section 8(aXl)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and Local 702, in violation of Section 8(bXlXA) and (2),
have entered into and are giving effect to an exclusive
hiring arrangement or practice in which length of
membership in Local 702 is the controlling factor. For the
reasons set forth below, I find that the General Counsel has
failed to sustain his burden of proving that the Act has been
or is being violated.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
oral argument at the hearing, I make the following:
194 NLRB No. 155

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Titra, a New York corporation, has a plant at North
Bergen, New Jersey, where it processes motion picture film.
Titra annually sells and ships film valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from New Jersey to customers in other
States. It is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Local 702 is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A.

Background

Local 702 represents the employees of a number of
companies engaged in the business of processing motion
picture film in the New York metropolitan area. Among
them is Titra. Titra was originally organized and brought
under contract by Local 702 in 1952.
From 1949 to 1961 Local 702's contracts, including its
contracts with Titra, contained an exclusive hiring
provision known as the industry experience roster. The
provision was dropped in the contract which was negotiated in 1960 and took effect in 1961. It does not appear in the
current contract, which took effect on October 1,1968, and
runs until September 30, 1971. The current contract
between Local 702 and the various film processing
companies, Titra included, does contain a valid unionsecurity clause (paragraph 1, Shop Agreement) which
requires membership in Local 702 as a condition of
employment after 30 days. Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 1
reads:
(e) In case of repeal or amendment of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 or in case of new
legislation rendering permissible any union security to
the Union greater than that specified in this paragraph
of this Agreement, then and in such event such
provisions shall automatically be deemed substituted in
lieu hereof. In such event, and if permissible under law,
the Union agrees to supply adequate, competent and
qualified employees for the job requirements of the
Employer in the classifications covered by this Agreement, and if the Union fails to do so within 48 hours the
Employer may secure such employees from any source.
The contract also contains a provision (paragraph 25,
Union Requirements) which reads:
No employee shall be required to perform any act or
work violative of the Constitution or By-Laws of this
Union. The Union hereby represents that the provisions
of this Agreement are not violative of said Constitution
or By-Laws.
Paragraph 7 of the contract is entitled "Work Distribution
and Layoffs." It provides for termination of employees with
severance pay in situations where work becomes scarce. It
also provides for employees in higher paid, more skilled job
classifications to bump those in lower paid, less skilled
classifications. Employees terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 have no recall rights.
Local 702's bylaws provide, in article 27:
Union seniority, as distinguished from plant seniori-

'...-'-..
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ty, shall be fixed for each member as of the date of his
initiation into membership in this Local.. . . When one
or more unemployed members are equally available and
competent to fill a job, preference shall be given in the
order of the Union seniority of said respective
unemployed members, but in the event that one or more
of said available unemployed members were inducted
on the same date, then and in that event, preference
shall be given to such of said unemployed available
members, who had been unemployed for the longest
period of time.
Article 26 of Local 702's bylaws provides, in part, for a $10
fine, suspension, and/or expulsion of a member found
guilty after trial of "soliciting employment in laboratories
under collective agreement with the Union, without the
Union's consent."
Local 702's membership is the only pool of experienced
film laboratory technicians in the New York area.
Consequently, despite the fact that they have not been
required by contract since 1961 to seek employees first
through Local 702, film laboratories have continued to call
Local 702 when they need experienced help to see if anyone
is available. When Local 702 refers an applicant to a
company, it fills out a three-part form. It keeps the pink
copy for its own file. It gives the white and yellow copies to
the applicant to take to the company The white copy is for
the company's records. The yellow copy goes to Local 702's
steward at that laboratory. There was little or no
unemployment in the film processing industry in the New
York area until 2 or 3 years ago. Since then, there have been
some experienced film technicians out of work.
Inexperienced persons breaking into the industry start as
preparation men, the least difficult and lowest paying job
classification in Local 702's contract. As they become
experienced they advance through jobs of increasing skill
and higher pay. Timers are the highest skilled and paid
technicians in the industry. Any experienced film technician can do the work of a preparation man.
B.

The General Counsel's Case

Neither Respondent presented any evidence at the
hearing, electing, instead, to stand on the record made by
the General Counsel. As a result, there is no dispute as to
the facts set forth above or in this section. The General
Counsel specifically disclaimed any contention that there is
an industrywide practice that film laboratories in the New
York area will hire through Local 702 exclusively. Indeed,
the testimony of three officials of three other laboratories
called by the General Counsel belies any such theory
because it establishes affirmatively that firms other than
Titra have no such arrangement with Local 702. The
General Counsel called these witnesses, in part, in an effort
to prove Local 702's desire to establish an exclusive hiring
arrangement with Titra by showing that it has made such a
demand on other employers in the industry. Their
testimony established, at most, that Local 702 has forced
other employers to rescind the hiring of new employees for
higher paying jobs such as timer and promote from within.
It has no probative value on the question whether Titra has
an exclusive hiring arrangement or practice with Local 702,
the basic allegation of the General Counsel's case.
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Eight other witnesses called by the General Counsel gave
testimony which did bear on this question. One was
Richard Gramaglia, executive vice president of Local 702
from 1940 to 1958 and president from 1960 to 1966.
Gramaglia testified that, as of the time he left office in 1966,
there was an "agreement" between Local 702 and
employers, Titra included, that "the employers, if they
needed any employees, would ask Local 702 for reference
of any people they had for jobs," Much of Gramaglia's time
on the stand was spent in a dispute with the General
Counsel as to whether Gramaglia had told the General
Counsel, before the hearing, that employers were required
to call Local 702 at the time he was president. Any value
that his testimony might have had to establish that Titra
had agreed to an exclusive hiring arrangement with Local
702 was destroyed when it became clear that he did not
know the meaning of the word which counsel had been
using to categorize Titra's commitment, if any, to Local
702, i.e., "obliged." On the basis of Gramaglia's testimony,
I find that Titra did not, in the period following the
abolition of its contractual obligation to use Local 702
exclusively as a source of new employees, make any explicit
agreement with Local 702 to continue to do so although it
did continue to ask Local 702 to refer experienced persons
to it when it needed help.
The other-seven witnesses called by the General Counsel
all worked for Titra at one time or another. One was
Corroado Nastasi, secretary-treasurer of Local 702. Nastasi
worked for Titra from 1947 until 1958. He was the steward
from 1952, when Titra was first organized, until he left. He
testified flatly that in the period from 1952 to 1958 Titra
hired persons who came to it from sources other than Local
702. In view of Titra's contractual obligation under the
"industry experience roster" during this period, I find this
testimony by Nastasi incredible. I have not, however,
discredited Nastasi generally. His testimony is, for example,
the basis for my findings above about Local 702's threecolored referral slip and how it is used.
Another ex-employee called by the General Counsel was
Louis Chiocco. Chiocco worked for Titra from 1954 until
1957. He was a member of Local 702's executive board
from 1965 until he resigned in November 1970. Chiocco
testified that, while he was an officer of Local 702, he
recommended that five or six persons be sent to jobs at
Titra, all but one of whom were hired. Among the persons
successfully recommended by Chiocco during this period
were Clement Falzarano, who was hired by Titra in 1967 or
1968, Joseph D'Amico, who was hired in December 1967,
George Chiocco, Louis' brother, who was hired in July
1968, and Emil Ognisanti, who was hired in 1966 or 1967.
In each case, Louis Chiocco recommended to Local 702's
president that the applicant be sent to fill an opening at
Titra and the man was sent to Titra, usually with a referral
slip. Louis Chiocco testified to no specific incident which
occurred on or after September 1, 1970, the 10(b) date in
these cases.
Two other witnesses, Joseph Conti and Chris Karinja,
went to work for Titra in 1952 and have been there ever
since. Conti was hired just at the time the plant was being
organized. He testified that he checked with the plant
manager every day for a period of several months. When
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the manager finally said he had an opening and would hire
Conti, he sent Conti to Local 702's office. When Conti
returned with a referral slip, he was put to work. Karinja
testified that he was called by an unnamed friend who knew
he was out of work and told to go to Local 702. He did so
and was sent to Titra with a referral slip.
The General Counsel's last three witnesses were all hired
by Titra in the period when the contract between Titra and
Local 702 contained no exclusive hiring agreement. Edward
Lanzillo testified that he was hired in November 1967. His
brother was working for Titra at the time. Lanzillo was
working as a tmckdriver and wanted a change. He asked
his brother to help him get a job at Titra. His brother spoke
to Local 702's steward. Lanzillo went to the plant, talked to
both the steward and the plant manager, and was sent by
the manager to Local 702 to get a referral slip. Lanzillo
returned the next day with the slip and was put to work.
Lanzillo was the only one of the three post-1961 hires called
by the General Counsel to testify about the manner of their
hiring who was interviewed by the plant manager before he
went to work.
Joseph D'Amico was hired in December 1967. He was
working as a longshoreman at the time, and work was
getting scarce. He asked Louis Chiocco to help him get a
job at Titra. When an opening developed, Chiocco asked
D'Amico if he wanted it. D'Amico said he did. Chiocco
brought a referral slip to his house. D'Amico went to the
plant and was put to work by the steward. He did not see
the plant manager until an hour or so later when the
manager arrived. The manager merely had him fill out the
papers, such as a W-4 form, usually required of new
employees. D'Amico testified that 13 persons were hired by
Titra after him. The only hirings which can be dated, from
D'Amico's testimony, as coming after September 1, 1970,
were those which took place in February 1971, about which
more below.
Finally, George Chiocco confirmed his brother's testimony about how George was hired by Titra. In June 1968
George asked Louis to get him a job in the film industry
because his job with a trucking firm was getting slow. Louis
Chiocco told him to go to Titra around the first of July. He
went, apparently without a referral slip. The plant was
closed for vacation at the time. Consequently, George
Chiocco spent his first 2 weeks in Titra's employ doing odd
jobs. When the plant reopened, Local 702's steward put him
1 The charges in these cases also allege that Local 702 and Titra
required employees to join Local 702 sooner than 30 days after they were
hired and that Titra discriminated against the Charging Party and others at
the behest of LocaJ 702. On April 13, 1971, in a letter to Clement
Falzarano. the Regional Director dismissed all allegations of these cues
other than the one litigated, i.e.. that Titra and Local 702 are "parties to an
exclusive hiring hall arrangement whereby job applicants [are ] referred by
the Union to employment on a preferential basis according to their
respective length of union membership." That letter also said, in pertinent
part:
The evidence adduced during the investigation is insufficient to
establish that the above-named labor organization caused or
attempted to cause Titra Film Laboratories to refuse to hire you
because of your political activities within the Union or that such
activities were the reason you were not hired by Titra. Rather Local
702 did refer you to Titra for employment and, contrary to your
contention, the investigation revealed no evidence to support the
conclusion that such referral was not made in good faith. Moreover,
the evidence does not establish that the Employer failed to hire you by

to work learning the duties of a preparation man. Like
D'Amico, George Chiocco did not see Titra's plant
manager until after the steward had put him on production
work. The interview, as in D'Amico's case, concerned
paperwork and not whether George Chiocco would or
would not be hired. George Chiocco testified that six
persons were hired after him. None can be dated from his
testimony as coming after September 1, 1970.
The whole thrust of the General Counsel's case is that
Titra has delegated the hiring function to Local 702. To this
end he elicited testimony from all his witnesses except
Gramaglia and Nastasi to the effect that everyone who
comes to work at Titra gets hired through Local 702. Based
on this testimony about what has happened in other cases
as well as what has happened to the witnesses themselves, I
find that Local 702's steward plays the key role in deciding
who will be hired when a job opens up at Titra. The
principal consideration, however, is not union membership
but nepotism. Once again, with the exception of the events
of February 1971 related in the next paragraph, all of the
evidence about the hiring of specific individuals, as
distinguished from Gramaglia's vague generalizations,
relates to persons inexperienced in the film processing
industry who were put to work initially as preparation men
and advanced to more skilled jobs as they learned the
business. Anyone who works in the plant or, apparently,
anyone associated with Local 702 can recommend to the
steward that a relative or a friend be given a job when one
becomes available. The steward keeps a list and decides,
according to his own discretion or according to the clout of
the recommender, who shall be hired. The lucky applicant
is sent to Titra with a Local 702 referral slip, reports to the
steward, and is put to work by him. The result is that Titra's
entire work force is made up of numerous groups of
employees who share close family and social ties. Since
there is no evidence that anyone has been hired by Titra in
recent years in any other manner, 1 find that Titra has, in
fact, delegated hirjng to Local 702. Therefore, I find, Titra
has continued to engage in the practice of using Local 702
as the exclusive source of employees even though its
contractual obligation to do so ended in 1961.
Joseph D'Amico and George Chiocco also testified about
the events in February 1971 which apparently gave rise to
these cases.1 On January 8, 1971, Titra terminated the last
13 men it had hired, pursuant to paragraph 7 of its contract
reason of any activity in which you engaged protected by the Act,
rather than as contended by the Employer because of your attendance
record during your previous employment by Titra, which reveals that
you were absent for approximately 64 days during calendar year 1970.
It is further noted that although your charge alleges that other
applicants for employment were not hired by Trtra because of their
intra-umon political activity, the evidence fails to establish that either
Titra or Local 702, through its exclusive hiring hall, denied
employment to any other applicant because of his activities within the
Union. Contrary to your contention that Titra assisted Local 702 by
referring newly-hired employees to the Union's office where they were
allegedly coerced into joining the Union prior to the expiration of the
30-day statutory grace period, the evidence adduced during the
investigation revealed that the actual referral procedure was not an
integral part of the hiring process and that such employees were not
advised that they were required to join the Union before the expiration
of the 30-day grace period as a condition of obtaining or maintaining
their employment with Titra.

. . . . .
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with Local 702. The order of their plant seniority was the
same as the order of their union seniority. George Chiocco,
a finisher at the time, was seventh from the bottom of the
list. Some, if not all, of the six below him were preparation
men at the time they were terminated. D'Amico and
Clement Falzarano were also among those terminated. As
their hiring dates set forth above indicate, they were higher
than Chiocco on the seniority list. In early February, Titra
called Local 702 for preparation men (whether two or five is
unclear in the record). Local 702 referred men to Titra who
were among the six below George Chiocco on the seniority
list and who were still preparation men at the time of their
termination. D'Amico and Chiocco protested to Local 702
that they should have been given the jobs because of their
greater seniority. They were told that the referrals had been
made on the basis of job classification and not on the basis
of seniority as, in fact, they had.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
I have found that Titra and Local 702 do, as contended
by the General Counsel, have an exclusive hiring arrangement or practice2 whereby Titra looks to Local 702's office
for experienced employees and to Local 702's agent, the
steward in its plant, for inexperienced help. That finding,
however, meets only half the General Counsel's burden, for
exclusive hiring halls are not, per se, illegal. Hoisting and
Portable Engineers, Local302 (West Coast Steel Works), 144
NLRB 1449. To supply the second half—operation of the
arrangement- in a discriminatory manner—the General
Counsel relies on an alleged presumption that Local 702
has given effect to article 27 of its bylaws in its dealings
with Titra. No authority for the existence of such a
presumption at law has been brought to my attention.
However, assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is
such a presumption, it is negated by the General Counsel's
evidence of the manner in which Titra's and Local 702's
exclusive hiring arrangement actually works.
The only incident which clearly falls within the 10(b)
period is also the only incident in the record in which
experienced union members rather than inexperienced
persons who had not yet joined Local 702 were referred to
Titra by Local 702. In that instance, both Joseph D'Amico
and George Chiocco, having been hired without experience
and trained initially as preparation men, and having
progressed to better paying jobs before they were
terminated, were clearly, in the words of article 27 of Local
702's bylaws, "competent to fill" the jobs for which Titra
sought men in February 1971. Both had greater union
seniority than the men who were referred by Local 702. If
Local 702 had given effect to article 27 at that time,
D'Amico and Chiocco, or possibly even ex-Titra employees
who were above them on the seniority list and yet were
caught in the January 1971 termination, would have gotten
the jobs. With respect to the other incidents in the record
where inexperienced persons were referred to Titra by
2 The General Counsel argues, in the alternative, that paragraph 7(e) of
the contract presently in effect between Titra and Local 702 constitutes an
agreement between them for an exclusive hiring hall. He reasons that
exclusive hiring halls are not illegal per se under the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, therefore, the language of paragraph 7(e) indicates
the parties' present agreement. Such an argument is obviously without
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Local 702, it is equally clear that article 27 was not invoked.
None of those persons had any union seniority at the time
he was referred. Presumably they all joined Local 702
somewhere along the way. But, as in the Regional Office's
investigation of the charges, there is no evidence in this
record that any person hired in this manner has ever been
required to join Local 702 as a condition of getting a
referral slip or sooner than the legal grace period allowed
him under the union-security clause of the contract
between Titra and Local 702. In fact, all of the evidence
relating to these incidents demonstrates affirmatively that
the union status of the applicant played no part in Local
702's decision to refer him.
If an inference is drawn that Titra, having called Local
702 for experienced help in February 1971, did so on other
occasions when article 27 was given effect by Local 702, the
General Counsel's case runs afoul of Section 10(b) of the
Act. The only evidence from which a finding could be made
that Titra hired anyone in the period after September I,
1970, other than the incident already discussed, is Louis
Chiocco's testimony that he recommended Local 702 send
five or six persons to Titra while he was an officer and that
his term ran until early November 1970. It is, I think,
insufficient to support a finding that any of the persons
recommended by Chiocco were, in fact, hired by Titra after
September 1, 1970. Therefore, the only hiring which took
place during the 10(b) period, insofar as the record is
concerned, is the one in February 1971 in which Titra and
Local 702 did not invoke article 27 and thus did no wrong.
On this state of the record, Section 10(b) of the Act
precludes a finding that the Act has been violated. Cargo
Handlers, Inc., 159 NLRB 321,327 (fn. 12).
For the reasons stated, I find that the General Counsel
has not sustained his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Local 702 has referred employees
to Titra, pursuant to their exclusive hiring arrangement or
practice, according to length of union membership,
especially during the 10(b) period.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire
record in these cases, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Titra Film Laboratories, Inc., is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 of
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United
States and Canada, AFL—CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that Titra has
violated Section 8(aXl) and (3) and that Local 702 has
violated Section 8(bX 1XA) and (2) of the Act have not been
sustained.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
merit. It requires a strained reading of the language which states what is to
happen in the event the law as it presently stands is changed The parties
could not have made clearer their intention, when they included paragraph
7(e) in their contract, of explicitly agreeing to an exclusive hiring hall only
if the Act is amended.
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and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER
The consolidated complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
REGION 8
Federal BoiWmS, Room 3614, !6 Federol Plaza
New York, New York

10007

T.Wp*»« KU-O300

March 31,
M r . Samuel Ptct
2615 Honecreit Ave.
Brooklyn, N . Y . 11235
M"ti;>n - i c t u r e Lab;-ratory
L^cal 7 0 ? , I A T S E , A F L - C K '
(Du-Art Laboratories, I n c . )
Case Ho: 2-CB-5115
Re

:>eir Sir:
Your charge in the above-entitled case a l l e g i n g a v i o l a t i o n under
Section 8 of the National Labor Relation* A c t , ai amended, has been
c a r e f u l l y investigated and considered.
•

AJ a r e m i t of tb* lnTC«ti|ation, it doe« not appear that further
on tb* charge arc warranted.
TS» aridattce 4o«« net t»t«J to •»ta»ll«h that the «bjTe-ni»»fl Unior.
violated tke BitlOBal Labor Relation* Act as alleged »jr fw.
The
•rridenee eitablliheg t h a t although the Union caused your employer,
Du-Art Laboratories, Inc. to t r a n s f e r you rather thae a n o t h e r mmpl^vee
to a lovtr-paying job in the b l a c k and w h i t e procaasing operation, said
aetloe *as ka»*d solely on the f a c t that you vere the least senior tun in
the pcrmaoont-eolor c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Ac U n i o n ' s actions in t h i s reg*r j
tb*r«fort cannot be deesed to have been su>tivated by aay a r b i t r a r y ,
Lavi4ious or othcrvise unlawful considerations. F u r t h e r , the evidence
40** not tend to establish that tb* Union violated the a f o r e s a i d Act ii
any other manner encompassed by your charge. J
to isioa a eo«— laiat IB this s»tt«r.

tf-3*
Rev. 8/70
- 2 Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations,
you may obtain a review of this action by filing an appeal with the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, Washington,
D. C. 20570 and a copy with me. This appeal must corrtain a complete
statement setting forth the facts and reasons upon which it is based.
The appeal must be received by the General Counsel in Washington, D. C.
by the close of business on
April 13, 1972.
Upon good ca--t
shown, however, the General Counsel may grant special permission for a
longer period within which to file. A copy of any such request for
extension of time should be submitted to me.
If you file an appeal, please complete the notice forms I have enclosed
rfith this letter and send one copy of the form to each of the other
parties. Their names and addresses are listed below. The notice forms
should be mailed at the same time you f i l e the appeal, but mailing the
notice forms does not relieve you of the necessity of filing the aroea'.
itself with the General Counsel and a copy of the appeal w i t h the R e g i o n a l
Director within the time stated above.
Very truly -yours ,
i

'
Enc.

'•

Ivan C.

Regional Director
REGISTERED MAIL
R.R.R.
cc :

General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
Washington, D. C. 20570
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, 1ATSE, WL-CIO
Attn: Mr. C. W. v i t e l l o
145 II. 4***
fci.
--- —
BOT Tork. I.T. 10036
M»to tt«U a»d Hour
Attn: Robert Mos«r, !•*.
270 Mtdison Ave.
•n Tork, H.T. 10016
Du-Art Laboratories, Imc.
245 Wait SStb St.
Ba» York, V.T. 10019

jj STATE O F N . Y . )
1 COUNTY OF N . Y . ) SS:
COSMO W. VITELLO, being duly sworn, depose? and says:
I reside at 95 Wayne Ave. , R i v e r e d p e , N. J.

My telephone ¥ Co 2-

7432 (201).
I am president and business agent of local 702 I A T S E , and have beer.
in this position for 6 years.
Around December of 1971, there was a layoff at D u - A r t , and b e c a u s e
|j of the layoff, a man was needed to fill a b l a c k and w h i t e d y e r s job or. t h < 'I
' day shift.

|;
I

'

Mickey DiGiacomo > the shop steward at Du Art i n f o r m e d the e x e c u t i v
board of the company's information that Vincent Seips, a wet end color m a n ,

i| on the third s h i f t , was low man and that he w o u l d be bumped i n t o the d a \t job, which w

tion, the union took the position that Seips w o u l d be the one to m o v e to the
day shift.
Seips appealed to the executive board of the union, c l a i m i n g t h a t the
union took the wrong position. We then had D i G i a c o m o check the company
records and found that even though Samuel Peet has more d e p a r t m e n t
seniority in the positive developing d e p a r t m e n t , Seips had m o r e s e n i o r i t y
in the classified color.
The union called both men up to the union o f f i c e , listened to t h e i r
fitories, and finally decided that a m i s t a k e had been m a d e , and c h a r g e d its
position. The executive board decided that Peet would be bumped, and not
Seips^ because Seips has more time in the color c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
It has always been the industry-wide policy that regardless of
seniority, the last man i n t o the color c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , will be the first man
out.

In this case, Seips was classified color before Peet, and therefore

Peet would be the one to move not Seips. Seips was classified color on
May 10, 1971( and Peet was classified color July 9, 1P71.

The p r i n t i n g d e p a r t m e n t is also broken down into black and w h i t e and color, and the same procedure is followed in thai d e p a r t m e n t .

In fact

any department with color and black and w h i t e b r e a k d o w n s would follow the
same procedure.
There is nothing in the c o n t r a c t t h a t covers this type of s i t u a t i o n .
The union suggested that Dave Blum should t a k e the job on the dav
shift and that Peet should take Blum's job, a wet end color job.

But Pet-t

told the union that he did not want the wet end j o b ( so we could not moveDave Blum.
Before the layoff took place, the company asked for men to pc or. the
third shift which it was just opening up.

Peet was asked to work the t h i r d

shift dry end job, but he refused it, because he did not want to work rr.iJnight s h i f t .

Seips took the job, but only if the company would c o n t i n u e to

pay him wet end pay.

He took the job and was classified color in May 1971.

The union is not carrying out any v e n d e t t a against P e e t , and is not
treating him unfairly in this case. There are no hard f e e l i n g s against Pee:
in the union. The union is simply treating the case the way it would any
other case. The union is following the past practice that it has always
followed, and is not making any exceptions in t h i s case.

He is a good u n i o n

man and there would be no reason for the union to be out to get him or to
treat him unfairly.

t•
\e read the above/statement and find that is true and a c c u r a t e .
C. W. Vitello Pres.
Sworn to and subscribed to before me the
15th day of M a r c h , 1P72.
Elbert F. Tellem,
NLRB Examiner
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Motion Picture Lahonitor) Technicians, Ixiral 702,
International Alliance of llu-alrical Stage Employees and M o v i n g Picture Machine Operators of the
I nilcd Slates and Canada, AKl^C'lO and Deluxe
General, Incorporated. Frank Cknanelli and Rose
Tardalo. Case 2 CB 4929

In fmilmg a violation of Sec. 8(bx3), Member b a n n i n g does not relv on
H r U f a l r Pamlinff and Decorating Corp. el al 186 N L R B No 140.453 K.2d
78.1 (C .A. 2. 1971). cert denied 31 L t d . 2d 455 (1972). cited by Ihe Trial
Examiner. In Member Tanning's view the legality of the Union's conduct m
this case, u n l i k e t h a t in H'eilgale Ptnnnnf> from which he dissented, does not
fall w i t h i n the criteria of lawful conduct set forth by the Supreme Court in
Scofield \. N L.R H., 3s>4 U.S. 421. and is not otherwise protected conduct

June 26. 1972

T R I A L EXAMINER'S DECISION

DECISION AND ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

BY M I M H I R S FANNING. JINKINS. AND
KENNEDY

SAMUEL M. SINGER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
was tried before me in New York, New York, on August 31
and September I, 1971, pursuant to complaint issued
March 19 based on charges filed on January 22, 1971. The
complaint alleges that Respondent Union violated Section
8(b)(lXA), (2). and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. as amended, by various acts and conduct including
forcing DeLuxe General Incorporated ("DeLuxe" or
"Employer") to hire and fill vacancies on the basis of
unionwide seniority (length of union membership): directing union members not to accept employment on othei
than union seniority under threat of union disciplinary
action; threatening the Employer with a work stoppage if it
employed an employee on other than union seniority basis:
unilaterally modifying its collective agreement with the
Employer to require filling vacancies in order of union
seniority; and disciplining and expelling two union
members (Charging Parties Giovanelli and Tardalo) for
accepting employment in violation of the Union's seniority
rule.
All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard and examine and cross-examine witnesses. All
filed briefs or memoranda. Lipon the entire record, 1 and
my observation of the testimonial demeanor of the
witnesses, I make the following:

On No\ember 3. 1971. Trial Examiner Samuel M.
Smgei issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. I'hereat'ler. the ( i e n e r a l Counsel and the
Respondent I ' m o n filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the Charging P a r t y . D e l u x e General,
Incorporated, filed cross-exceptions, and an answernit 1 hnef 10 Respondent Union's exceptions.
Pursuant to t h e p r o x i M o n s of Section 3(b) of the
N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s \ct. as amended, the
N a t i o n a l I .ibor R e l a t i o n s Board has delegated i t s
a u t h o r i t v in t h i s pioccedmg to a three-member panel.
I he Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to a f f i r m the Trial Examiner's
r u l i n g s , f i n d i n g s . 1 and conclusions- and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
I ' u r s u a n i to Section I0(c) of the National Labor
R e l a t i o n s Act. as amended, the N a t i o n a l Labor
R e l a t i o n s Hoard adopts as i t s Order the recommended Ordei of the I r i a l E x a m i n e r and hereby orders
t l i . i t t h e Respondent Motion Picture Laboratory
1 ccimicians. l o c a l 702. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Alliance of
The.itncal Stage Employees and Moving Picture
Machine Operators of the L'mted States and Canada.
A EL CIO. its officers, agents, ami representatives,
s h a l l l a k e the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
recommended Order, as so modified.
S u b s t i t u t e the name "Frank Ciiovanelli" for that of
John Cunningham in paragraph 2(c) of the recommended Order.
' I he I N.I! I \ a i n i n c i . in p.u -id of his recommended Order.
c n t ' i u • • • : N | \d the name John C unninj:h;im. m-.le.id of Ihe name
} rank v H o v . i n e l l i as t h e expelled member We shall modifs the Order to
eorrct. l (his i n a d v e r t e n t e r r o r
-' \ e agree w i t h the I rial Examiner's conclusions that Respondent's
conducl in seeking to e n f o u e its union-seniority rule violated Sec
K l h K l i ( A ) and m b j ( - t of the At! We also agree that its unilateral actions as
scl f o r t h rn the Trial Fxammer violated Sec. 8(b>(3) of the Act However, m
the C i r c u m s t a n c e s . we f i n d it unnecessarv to pa*.s upon or to consider
w h e t h e r Rcspondenl's unum-senu»nt\e is^vr \ vioiative of the Act Nor
Ji> w e pass upon the I r i a l Examiner's conclusion that absent an exclusive
hinnj; hall a r r a n g e m e n t , a union mas refer its members on the basis of
l e n g t h of u n i o n membership

'

•;

FINDINGS 01 FAO
I. JURISDICTION
DeLuxe. a New York corporation, maintains its office
and place of business in New York City, where it is
engaged in film processing and related services. During the
past representative year, it performed services valued in
excess of $50,000 for customers located outside New York
State I find that at all material times DeLuxe has been an
Employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce 'within the meaning of the Act and that
assertion of jurisdiction herein is proper.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION

INVOLVED

Respondent Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1

Transcript corrected bs my order on notice dated September 30. 1971.

N I . R B N o.
•

1)1 ( ISIONS Ol NATIONAL I \BOR RELATIONS BOARD

938

I I I . A U K . I I ) ( M A I K l A H H K PRACTICTS

A.

I.

Contractual lelalions

because of race . . . union membership." etc. Section 2^
slates:
No employee shall be required to peitorm a n v .:ct CM
work v i o l a t i v e ol the ( o n s t i t u t i o n 01 Hv I a w s o! t!"i
L : mon. I h e Union h e r e b y r e p r e s e n t s t h . i t the p i o v i sions of this Agieement aie not viol.iir. e ot said
Constitution or B y - l aws
L'mallv. section I ? ( " A d j u s t m e n t of Disputes' ) p i o v ides foi
resolution of grievances, i n c l u d i n g " t m a l and hmdm-:"
arbitration by the "permanent" mdiistrv a i b i t r a t o i It also
provides (see. I 5 ( h ) ) t h a t :
Pending the f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of air. d i s p u t e , iheu
shall he no strike or lockout, nor shall theie be anv
change of working conditions or methods of operation
as they existed prior to the dispute except as tlu-v mav
he otherwise permitted bv this aurcemcni

Del uxc and Local 702 have been parties to a sciles of
collective agreements. Ihe most recent of which (ami the
one here i n v o l v e d ) covering the pei lod Octohei I. !%!>', to
October I, 1471. I h e bargaining unit consists of w h a t is
normally refened to as production and maintenance
employees, employed in \anousjoh titles and broken down
by clepaitment in accordance w i t h schedule A of the
contract. In the fall of 1970. when the pertinent events
arose, the bart!amine
u n i t at Del uxe consisted of about
C
t_
360 employees.
\
The contractual provisions relevant here include section
I providing for a union-shop clause (i.e.. u n i o n member2. ___Umo:i h v l a w s : the union semonlv rule
ship as a c o n d i t i o n of e m p l o y m e n t al'ler 30 da\ on the
job), notice to the Union of new l i n i n g w i t h i n 7 days
A i t i e l e 3. section 4. of Local 702's b y l a w s p r o v i d e s t h a t
thereof, and an employe! commitment to piovidc for union
"it shall be mandatory lot all members to obe\d l i v e up
security "greater t h a n t h a t specified" in t h e c o n t r a c t
to Ihe Union's Rules set forth in Article 2(\" I lute; a ' t i i u
( i n c l u d i n g Use of I oial 7(C as Ihe sole souice foi new
^(>. seclion ! ( ! > a mcn:l>ei mav be l i n e d , suspended 01
employees) if l a w f u l l y pernntled" |i|nc.iseol repeal ol the
expelled for v a r i o u s m l i a c t i o n s . m c l u d i n i ; "so'ncitnvj
Labor Management p \ct ol I ' M / " or an amend me ill
empliAinent in l.iboiatones undei collective a:Mee"ient
theieof Section 7. d e a l i n g w i t h "woik distribution a n i l
w i t h t h e U n i o n . v \ i l h o i ; t t h e U n i o n ' s consent " X n u U - ? '
lavolls," p i o v ides, inh'i <l!lil
p i o v i d e s t h a i "union s i a i o m v " n e . l e n g t h . ' l o v . < . '
In the e v e n t ol a l a v o l l in , i n \t lonsislmi:
liiemhei ship) ra'hei t h a n p l a n ! - e n i o i i t v %h i l l ^ o \ e : n
of more i h . n i one c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , il an cnipiov.ce in a
unemployed men.bers competing toi jobs I hiis sectu'll
hiL'hcr c l a s s i f i c a t i o n sh.ill I n it be affected b\h
l ( a ) o t l u a l a i l i c l e slates
la\ofl. such emplmee allecled. h a v i n g departmental
\Vhen one 01 m o i e u n e r . i p l o v e d membei - a i e Ci|iial!\U aiiJ. •.
sen ion tv shall h a v e the op lion io be i ev cried to I lie n e x t
lower classification in t h a t department in accordance
be g i v e n in the oidet of Ihe U n i o n s e m o i i i v o! s.iui
w i t h his departmental sciiiouty 01 .iciepl seveiance pa\d t h e employee f i n a l l y displaced shall b e l a i d o i l . In
respective u n e m p l o v e d memlvis. b u t i n t h e e v e n t t h a t
one or moie ol said a* ' l i a b l e u n e n i p l o x e d ' i i e m b e i i
the e v e n t t h e employee a f l e e t e d w . i s transferred Irom
were inducted or the s.m c dale, then ain! in th..M ev ent
a n o l h c i i l e p a l l m e n l 01 classification w i t h i n the p l a n t ,
p i e f e r e m e shall be 1'iven to such ol s.ud u i ' r e ' r . p l o x e . l
lie skill h . i v r the uption ol icv ei In:-, to a position in Ins
a v a i l a b l e membei-. w l u > had been u n e n i p i o \! !oi i|-.e
former d e p a i t m c n l 01 classification and lel.iin his
longest period of time.
accumulated s e n i o n t v in such t o i m e i d e p a r t m e n t 01
Oa
Septemhei 25. l l >7(i. [ho Union adopted a resolution
classification. In no e v e n t shall an employee be
applying its"unu>n seniority" rule not o n l v i , > u n e m p l o v e d .
t r a n s f e i i e d lo a n o l h e i department unless he had
but to emploved members, ineliiiiris; those in .1 i c v e i t i d
p i c v i o n s K been employed in t h a t department.
status so thai even 'hose employees co-iK 1 not accept
I his section also p n . v i d e s t h a t laid oil employees or
<'lher positions (even these t h e v held w i t h t h e i r o w n
employees reduced in cl.i .iiiicalion "shall be entitled to
e m p l o v e r |M 101 io t h e i ' l e v e r s i o n ) u n l e s s u m o ' i s e m o n l v
d e m a n d and i c e c i v e .seveiance pas" and upon p a y m e n t
was followed In e f l e c t . u n i o n s e n i o n t v was made the
theieof "the einplovees' l e n n i e in t h e plain shall he
contiollmg ciilenon for f i l l i n g v a c a n t jobs \vheihe r those
teniiinated." At the he.inn;:, the I nion conceded that all
|obs were being competed fvM bv u n e m p l o v e d membei s 01
laid-off emplo\ees i n v o l v e d in t h i s p r o c e e d i n g f a l l w i l l n n
those piesciltK emploved in othei c l . i s s i t i c a i . o i i i \ i c o i d t h i s calcL'orv and m a v he regarded as "funnel employee-."
ing to Union President and Business AL'C'II \ i t c l ! . 1 . the
I h e c o n l i . u l is s i l e n t w i l h respect lo i r e m p l o v n i e n l r i g h t s
Seplembei r u l e vi,.is ulopled "lor the ber.el'l ol t h e old
of laid-oll einplovees w h o did noi clei I lo t a k e scvci.mcc
l i n i e r s in tin. l o c a l " w i t h t h e k n o w l c d . ' C t h a t n v \ a s
p.IV I I is c o n c e d e d t h a i omission t ,| p i . i x i s i o i i s o n s u c h
c o n t i a i v to the contractual " l e v e i s i o i i i lansc- and i n
m a l l e i s "was d e l i b e r a t e and intended allei the discussion
"conflict w i l h the policies of Del uve " II is dear, an>1 I
of Ihe issues relaluii. 1 thereto in n<-:'oii.mons lor the
f i n d , t h a i a t leasi i , . the e x i e n : t h a t u n i o n M."iiuiiit\i
| i u i i e n t | agiccnicnl
I h e c o n l i . u l l o n l a i n s spccilu
made a p p l i c a b l e to e i n p l o v e e s in a l e v e l l e d s t a t u s who
provisions covering "temporary n . i n s i e i s "
sought to i c t u i n to the:; lormei positions and conk! not do
Section 1 provides t h a t no cmplov.cc "shall be discmmso because of then lower r a n k i i M ' as a m e m l v i . t h e t mon s
nalcd a g a i n s t 01 depnved of employment 01 piomolion

IAIS1.. IXK'AI. 702

resolution was contrary to ihe collective-bargaining agreemem
On M.nch II. 1971. ihc Union, iipun advice of counsel,
rescinded the September 1970 resolution. Since that date.
Local 702 has not required members in a reverted status to
abide by union scnionlv. However, the Union slill takes
the position that its members must comply with Article 27
of its bylaws, under which union seniority still is. and
a l w a y s has been, the rule with respect to members
acccpimi: new employment According to Union President
Vitcllo. "If an employei calls the Union, we will send out
member*according to I mon seniority."
3.

Cast referral and luring practices

I lie collective agreement, negotiated on a gioup basis, is
substantially identic.il to those signed by 14 employers in
the are.t. Union President Vitello estimated that normally
about 50 percent of the Local's members (membership
fluctuate-, around 2.000) are referred 10 new positions
through the Union's hiring hall on the basis of union
seniontv. lndusiii.il Relations Representative Slusser
testified that the Company "has historically used the
Union to obtain a trained source of employment,"
indicating, however, that it was "absolutely not" its sole
source General Counsel concedes that employers (including IVI ,ixc) arc not requ red to hire exclusively through
the I mon and t h a t the Union lias operated a nonexclusive
hiring hall.' According to Slusser. the Company generally
fills vacancies w i t h "ie\eitcd personnel" i.e.. it returns a
l.ud-ofl employee to the job or department where he
formcilv w o r k e d , or. if such cmplovees are unavailable, it
o f i e i s ihe \ a c a n l |ob !.> nlhcis in the plant (iisint; a posted
piomoiion list) o; to foimcr l.nd-off employee- "familiar
w .;h tiic geneial opeiation of the plant": or. as a last resort.
it icqiii sts new help Iron; the I 'mon or lures directK "from
the slice! " I in.MI President Vitello leslified that, in
aciord.incc w i t h the Union's In laws, the Union always
refeis emplovees "b\n seniority*" in response to
employer icijiicsis: .ind that in Ins "opinion*1 employees
can solicit then o w n jobs although "we would like them to
go thiouiih the union." \\'hen refened to article 26. section
Idi. forbidding members to solicit employment directly
" w i t h o u t the I mon's consent." Vi;ello indicated that he
could not i e s t i f \s to the opeialion of that clause nor
indicate the circumstances under which the Union would
consent to direct solicitation.
4

Ihe November h>"0 layoffs and attempts to
fill vacancies: the arbitration award

On November 9. I970."1 DeLuxe laid off 50 employees
for economic reasons In view of the contractual rights of
employees, in the even! of a lavoff. "to he reverted to the
next lowei classification in thai department" and "of
r e v e r t i n g to .1 position in his former deparlment or
classification" (Set lion 7 of the contiact). the lavoff
1 \ .Mit iiMu. iht- 1 M'.MI iix'k llu- [•'•sin,>n lli.tl il had .111 exclusive
idcir.ii .i^ui-iik-nl. hu' tin- pcmi-ini-iil ai hitia'.oi ruled otherwise and,
.llll'ljim' t.' t l l C I J l i . M l

II I].!' .iNdl'.i h\! dl'lerilim.llloM

' I nlost'lhoniise indi.atcd .ill .l.iu's in tins .IM.I subsequent sections .,,.l*j V
in s.vkiiif I., ii'.iki- llu letup." i i \v s.nsse: relied on h>

'
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actually involved 100 to 150 "moves" in a sort of "musical
chairs" or bumping action. In early December, four
vacancies developed in the printing department and
Industrial Relations Representative Slusser offered the jobs
to four employees (Mini, Zurenda, Mannelli, and Morgan)
who had been reverted out of that department during the
November lavoff. Upon informing the union steward
(IV/nlo) of this offer, the latter referred Slusser to Union
President Vilello. Vitello told Slusser that Ihe Union's
recent (September 1970) resolution (supra, sec. A.2) on
"union seniority" precluded the four employee-members
from reverting back and that he would have to hire "the
most senior unemployed" Local 702 members whether or
not they were previously employed by DeLuxe. explaining
at the hearing that the September union resolution was
passed because of "a high degree of unemployment in the
industry." When Slusser stated that he would then
temporarily transfer the four into the priming department
until "we could . . . iron out the problem." Vilello
objected, insisting again that the Company must hire the
"senior unemployed people."•''
The next day. Slusser spoke with three of the four
employees (Mini, Zurenda. and Morgan), advising them
that they were being "temporarily transferred." but all
three said they "could not take the temporary assignments"
because "they had been instructed by [the] Union not to
take it." At the hearing, the Union admitted the allegation
in the complaint that Vilello "directed" all foil! employees
slated for the reverted positions "not to accept transfers
upward or reemployment . . . and then warned them inat
failure to comply with such directive could result in
disciplinary action."
Unable to fill the vacancies with "reverted" employees.
Slusser subsequently (the ne.xt week) sought to rehire four
other employees (Giovanelli, Ploski. Cunningham, ami
Lawlar) who had been laid off or severed in the November
layoffs. All four had worked in the printing deparlment
(where the openings existed) an I were regarded by the
Company as among its best and most senior employees.
Advised of the Company's intention, Vitello said that he
did not believe that all four were "senior people in the
industry" and again insisted that the Company must hire
on the basis of the union seniority Slusser demurred,
explaining that he had "no intention to hire people from
another lab when there were [satisfactory! people on the
street who had worked at DeLuxe." He then contacted the
four employees and all accepted the jobs, filled out
applications and W-4 forms, and were scheduled to start
work on particular days and shifts. However, the Union
permitted only one of the four (Lawlar) to accept
employment after learning that she had the requisite union
seniority. Ihe others were instructed by the Union not to
woik because they lacked union seniority. Vitello sent
Cunningham a telegram directing him to report to the
Union's office instead of to DeLuxe, warning him that
"fonir.-u'iual ti£hi" to do so un.lcr set- 13 of Ihe colleilne agreement and on
a direthM' issue.( hy rhr permanent ar^nr.mtr m another tase on OuobiT s
thai dni-cliM' requneil cm|i|ovefN to accept temporary transfers .ind
pr.'Mde,! that am union objections to such transfers must he h.indleJ
Ihrouph (he £tie,ancc piocedurr

•

:
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"Failure to comply ( w i t h the Union's ordei | will result in
severe disciplinary action oy the executive board."
While C u n n i n g h a m anil I'lo.ski acceded to Ihi- Union's
directives, Giovanelli ( t h e f o u r t h employee offered employm e n t ) did not. After several meetings with Vitello on the
question of hiring. Slusscr on or about December IS f i n a l l y
i n f o r m e d Vilello t h a t C iiov.mclli would repoit lo w o i k .
V i t e l l o warned that il this lakes place, "there w i l l be no
printing in Del.uxe laboratory . . . I'll pull the whole
plant."' 1
The question of the Company's right to hire Giovanelli
was submitted for a r b i t r a t i o n by the Union and Company,
the latter referring to the Union's "threatened . . . mass
stoppage and walkout" if Ciiovanelh were put back to
work. In accordance w i t h the Union's request, Ciiovanelh
was not rehired pending determination of the dispute.
A f t e r a hearing on the issue, the permanent arbitrator on
December 28 issued his award, f i n d i n g that the hiring of
Giovanelli "is not and would not be violative of the
Collective Agreement." thereby rejecting the Union's
contention that the Company w a s required to hire on the
basis of uinon seniority. The a r b i t r a t o r also noted th.it
there "is evidence that the U n i o n committed two ad hoc
and temporary violations" of his p i i o r (Decembei 14, 1970)
award in another situation and that the Union here
"threatened one a d d i t i o n a l violation." T h e arbitrator
served notice on the Union t h a t he expected his orders and
a w a r d s "to be strictly followed "
5

1 he Union's disciplinary action against two
member employees who returned to work in
violation of the union seniority rule

Following the arbitration award, on January 4, 1971,
Giovanelli and Tardalo, another laid-off employee, returned to work. On the same day. Union President Vitelio
filed identical "charges" against each alleging t h a t they
violated article 27 of the Union's bylaws ( t h e union
seniority rule) because they "went to work w i t h o u t legard
to rights and seniority of fellow employees" and also article
26, section l(f). of the b y l a w s (precluding job solicitation
w i t h o u t union consent). 7 Fach was notified that "said
charges will be read at our ne\ membership meeting on
Friday. J a n u a r y 8. 1971." Ciiovanelh and Tardalo were
later tried and found g u i l t y of violating both b y l a w s by
Local 7()2's Executive Board on January 22, 1971. and
expulsion from membership was recommended. On March
6, 1971, the membership acted on t h a t recommendation
and both employees were expelled from membership and
their tender of dues returned.' 1 However, both continued to
work at Del.uxe w i t h o u t f u r t h e r union request for their
discharge.
B

I . The basic issues heie presented concern : (I) validity
f Respondent's "union siMiioiity" rule and ( _ ) application
* R.lscil on Shlssct's ocdili-il Ics1imon\. hilc Vilrllo ^.cncr.ilh ilrnu-J
llirc.ilrniri)' l ) r l imr u i t h .1 s l n h r iu woik slo|ip.ipr. IM mlmillril w;miin^
Slussrr i h . i " i h r u ui.iv l>c .1 stopp.ip i > \r ininlfDt which witt grl iwi id
control jnd Khieli I wouldn't lit- ablo lo control "
7 (iiov.-indli was prrviousK summniH'il lt> appear ill the t ' H I O I I ' N ofhic

and enforcement of that rule by the U n i o n through
attempts to induce and force Del.uxe and I 'nuni member
lo abide by that rule. The rule in question ( a r t . 27 of tli.
Union's b y l a w s ) provides that length of membership in t h <
Union (as distinguished from length of employment in th
plant or bargaining u n i t ) governs unemployed members
cor.ipetmg for jobs. Hy resolution adopted :n Seplembc 1
1970. the uile was broadened to applv lo all members
including those employed in the plant, so t h a t employee
members were barred from accepting permanent return o:
temporary transfer to higher classifications from which
they had been "revei'-.'d," except in "union seniority'
order. In other words, union seniority was the controlling
criterion for filling jobs both bv applicants for nev.
employment and members already employed.
2. Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act makes n an u n f a i r
labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce'
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7.
Under Section 7 employees are guaranteed the right to
form. join, or assist labor organizations, and "the right t.
refrain from any or all such a c t i v i t i e s . " H o w e v e r . th. proviso to Section 8(b)(!)(A) preserves the light of a umor:
"to prescribe its own rules w i t h respect to acquisition or
retention of membership therein" Applying those p r o \
sions, the Supreme C'ourt has held t h a t the language an.
legislative history of Section 8 ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) made il plain tha
Congress "left internal union a f f a i r s to union self-govern
ment" and that the section did not contemplate the
regulation of internal union discipline, such as fines or
expulsion from membership. \.L.R.fi \
A//IV Co.. 3HS U.S. 175, 185 Accordingly n i< not i m l . i w f u :
for a union to f i n e members for crossing a picket l i n e
( Allis-Chalniers. supra). or lo discipline employees foi
exceeding production ceilings (l^x-iii JV>'.', I'ruted Automobile Workers (Wisconsin Motor Corp}. 145 M.RB 1097.
1099 -O4, affd. xuh num. Scoftc!d\. \ 394 U.S. 42"<
Standing alone, the union-seniority rule here involve-.:
appears to serve a legitimate union concern to spreaJ
employment among members and, in my view, is no'
u n l a w f u l . It is conceded that the collective agreement
between Respondent and DeLuxe was not an c v c l i i w i
referral contract and that the contract du' not preclude
employees from obtaining employment directly fr.nr, the
F.mployer. Accordingly. I reject General Counsel's anc
Charging Party's contention t h a t the union semontv r u l e in
itself constitutes illegitimate exercise of union power and ;s
in effect per st* violative of the Act. Absent an exclusive
h i r i n g hall arrangement, a union may refer its members on
the basis of length of union membership See [-'rank l\iulev
etc.. International Association nf Bridge. SlructuNli am!
Ornamental Iron Workers, etc., (John f~. fifii.\le\- Conxirucl ion Company I. 152 Ml RB 1409. 1414
3. However, as the Supreme C'ourt pomte.1 in \r. >(V/</,
supra, both legislative history and its prior AHis-Chalnvn
decision (supra ) have "distinguished between intern. '.I and
external enforcement of union r u l e s " 394 U.S. at 4?8
1 hus, while a "union rule duly adopted and not the
on tVccmhrr ?l. aflct n t M i f u n l i o n lh.it he »;»<• in \iolnhon of i
sciiti'iil\. tiilitri l l t i r i t l ol ' aisi iphn.li \" il he (,-xilr.l l>
ui Ihr I n l . I n.tli
11 1 IM (wo nnplovrrs l i n v r . I J > | M .th .1 Iliru r x p
hut the lallci h.ut lu>l \cl <u Ic J Ihrrco
of the t.ilr of ihc hr
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a i h i i i . u v fiat of a union oflicci" is "enforceable against
v o l u n t a i y union members by expulsion or a reasonable
fine" (ihid ), it is not enforceable so as to affect a member's
emplo\nil-lit stains. As staled in Scofield. 394 U.S. at
428 429.
The Court [in Allis-Chalmers. supra ] thus essentially
accepted the position of the National Labor Relations
Board dating from Minneapolis Star A Tribune Co., 109
N L R B 727 (1954) where the Board also distinguished
i n t e r n a l from e x t e r n a l enforcement in holding t h a t a
union could f i n e a member for Ins failure to take part
in picketing d u r i n g a strike but lhat the same rule could
not be enforced bv causing the employer to exclude
him from the work foice or be affecting his seniority
w i t h o u t triggering violations of Sections 8(b)(l).
8(h)(2). 8(a)< I ) . 8(a>(2). and K(a)(3). These sections form
a web. of w h i c h Section S ( b l ( l ) i A ) is only a strand,
p r e v e n t i n g the u n i o n f i o m i n d u c i n g the employci to
use the emoluments of the |ob to enforce the union's
rules. (Footnotes omitted.]
The C'ourt (.194 U.S. at 428. fn M went on to affirm its
earlier pronouncement in Radii > Of/iccrs'
l/niun v.
\./..K K. 347 U.S. 17. 40. that "The policy of the Act is to
i n s u l a t e employees" jobs from their organizational rights.
I l i t i v Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed to allow
employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be
good, bad or indifferent members, or abstain from joining
any union w i t h o u t imperiling their livelihood."
Here the record shows that Respondent's conduct was
not confined to "internal enforcement" of its union
seniority rule. It took repeated steps "to affect a member's
e m p K n m e n t status." (Scoficld. supra. 294 U'.S. at 428). Not
only did n threaten disciplinary action against employeemembers if the\d employment in contravention of
Us union seniority rule in "reverted" or new classifications,
bin it v igoroush sought to force the Employer to apply the
I mon's internal rule in all hiring, i.e.. it insisted that
preference in all employment he conditioned on length of
u n i o n membership. l o bring home t h a t this was not an idle
t h r e a t . U n i o n President Vitcllo threatened a mass work
stoppage if ihe I'.nplover hired ( i i o v a n e l l i in breach of the
union seniority rule Furthermore, as presently shown, by
seeking to force Del u\ to abide by the sweeping union
seniority rule (as promulgated in its September 1970
resolution) and b\r preventing four "reverted"
emplovces from accepting employment. Respondent effect i v e l y sought to impose unilateral terms and conditions of
e m p l o y m e n t in violation of Section 8(bX3) of the Act.
Respondent was in effect seeking to require its members to
abet its own breach of the collective agreement—action in
itself contrary to public policy. See Local 12419. etc..
United Mine Worken of America (National Grinding Wheel
Compam. Inc.). 176 N L R B 628.
Under all the circumstances. I f i n d that Respondent's
conduct in seeking to enforce its union seniority rule had
its necessary and unlawful effect of encouraging union
membership, m violation of Section 8(b)(lXA) and (2) of
the Act Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators

and I'aperhnngers. etc., 242 F.2d 477, 481 (C.A. 10). See also
Patterson v. Tulsa Uicat No. 513, etc., 78 LRRM 2068, 2071
(C.A. 10).
4. As found (supra, sec. A, 2), on September 25, 1970,
during the contract period, but before the events here
involved, the Union adopted a resolution requiring
members already employed (as well as unemployed
members) to adhere to the union seniority rule. As a result,
four employee-members (Mini, Zurenda, Marinelli. and
Morgan) were precluded from reverting to positions
(higher classifications) they previously held in the printing
department, the Union insisting lhat the vacancies be filled
w i t h "the most senior unemployed" members, whether or
not formerly employed by DeLuxe. The Union similarly
insisted lhat Ihe Employer refrain from transferring these
employees lo ihe higher classifications on a temporary
basis all in bieach of the collective agreement and the
arbitrator's previous awards sanctioning such transfers
Respondent was in effect seeking to unilaterally change
terms and conditions of employment— both with respect to
initial hiring and upgrading working employees—by
attempting to foist and foisting upon the Employer its
union seniority rule, in breach of the collective agreement
under which the Employer was free to hire, revert, and
temporarily transfer employees without prior union approval. Furthermore, it is conceded that during the
contract negotiations the Union sought, but failed, to
achieve provisions of the type it now sought to impose
during the contract period. This case is, therefore,
analogous to Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers of America, etc., (Westgate Painting and
Decorating Corp.), 186 N L R B 964 where a majority of the
Board found that ihe union there unilaterally implemented
a production quota rule (forbidding employees to paint
more than 10 rooms a week), in violation of Section 8(bX3)
of the Act. The Board stated:
. . . the Union unilaterally effected changes in wages
and the workweek which were neither sanctioned bv
the contract nor accepted by the Employers. The
Union, by its action after the new agreement was
executed, thus sought lo secure without bargaining
what it had failed to achieve in bargaining. Therefore,
the Union's unilateral implementation of its 10-room
rule constituted a change in terms and conditions of
employment sufficient to preclude the continued
imposition of the rule without the agreement of the
Employer. Accordingly, we find . . . that the Union,
by unilaterally enforcing its 10-room maximum production quota . . . violated Section 8(bX3) of the Act.
Based on the above-cited decision, I conclude that
Respondent's unilateral actions here likewise constituted a
violation of Section 8(bX3) of the Act. !<
5. As also found (supra, sec. A, 4). in addition to
barring reversions and transfers within the plant, Respondent invoked its union seniority rule to bar employment to

v In his hi iff. liener.il ( 'on use! .ui \.uucs \.itious ^loundv in addition IP
III.isc rrlu-d on in this Pension, lo |iisiif\s «f K(»(.t) violahons
Anutn^ ihcsf for ex.tmple, is ihi- HK-OIV lhat Respondent's conduct was "in

derogation" of previously rendered arbitration awards In view of the result
reached. I find it unnescssar) lo consider General Counsel's other theories
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three former employees (laid-off employees Ciiovanelli,
I'loski. and Cunningham).1" All w c i e offered employnieiit
directly hy the Employei and all accepted the offers and
were ready to report to work. While two of the three
yielded to u n i o n pressure to abide by the rule, the t h i r d
(Ciiovanelli) did not. On J a n u a r y 4, .subsequent to the
arbitrator's award upholding the Employer's contractual
right to lure employees without regard to union seniority.
Giovanelli and a n o t h e r employee ( l a r d a l o ) f i n a l l y returned to work. The Union, however, continued to press its
disciplinary charges against Giovanelli and also Tardalo
for violatiim the u n i o n seniority rule and on January 22 the
Union's Executive Hoard found them g u i l t y (supra, sec. A.
5)." On March 6, 1971, the Union "expelled both
employees from membership.
( l a v i n g found t h a t the u n i o n seniority rule, as enforced,
was illegally imposed on the employees, t h a t It was sought
to be enforced through the employer as a condition of
employment, and t h a t us i m p l e m e n t a t i o n was in breach of
the subsisting collective agreement, I Cm [her find and
conclude l h a ! the disciplinary action taken against Giovanelli and Tardalo for accepting the Employer's offer to
work c o n s t i t u t e d " r e s t r a i n t and coeicion" w i t h i n the
meaning of Seciion K ( h ) ( l ) ( A ) of ih, Act As in l^icul
J2-1JV, etc.. l.'nncd Mine H'wA<T\/ Anntica (Sationu!
(,rim/in^ HV;»v/ C/i/>i/hi>i\. Itn I. I 7 < > N l . R I J (>28, the
"penalty to compel conduct in violation of [the Union's
c o n l i a i l i i . i l | obligation is also one w h e n 1 the i m m u n i t y
based on the i n t e r n a l character of the discipline is
overcome by its offense to basic .statutory policy." In
Nalinnal (.irindin^ H heel the union fned l(> members for
crossing a sister union's l a w f u l picket line. However, the
governing collective agreement contained a no-strike
clause and, accordingly, the fines were held to be penalties
for n;> nihers' r e f u s a l s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n work stoppages
forbidden b\e collective agieeinent. I he Board adopted
the reasoning of my colleague. I nal Examiner A. Norman
Somers t h a t
The policy in tins case conceins the adherence to the
terms of a contract between representatives of employers and employees and the condemnation of their
violation. This is indeed i m p l i c i t in the preamble of the
Act from its inception (Sec I I and in (he reports of
both houses of Congress . . . . To hold t h a t a union,
despite the prohibition in Section K ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) against
1 1 1 I In- f o u r t h employee l l . i u l . i ' i was a l l o w e d l . « w o r k heeanse she had
the iei|<asiie union seniority
1 1 I hi1 two emplovees wer-.- also f o u n d lo h a \ ^ l o l a l e d (he I men's r u l e
a g a i n s t Mrticitinu employment w i t h o u t .anon .onsent. h u l i h e i e ts no
r v i d e i K c t h . i i t h e v soheiled Ihe | « ' l > s
'*' I n \. i < r Ihv ahnve-xJuled cunt ltiM.ni it iiKiiifis n.t| that llu1 t it ion
a l l o w e d '.hi l u o e i l i j > l o \ , - e s ! « w o i l - a f U i e x p u l s i o n l l o i : i l l i e m h e l s h l p
\ * i l h o i i l u n i o n i n k - i l i - i e m e I n ..n\l l l u - l » o « i - i e ik-pmed ol w o i k
d n n i l ; - I >,-, e n i t > e l . pi i»i lo l l u a l l ' l l f . i l a w . m t .is .: K - . n l : ol llu 1 m o i l ' s
a p p l u a t I- > l < o! t h e n u ' o n si-1 no • ! , : im
A' i n l l u i .is,- i.f Ins I n i l i i u m ol t h e - Sll.li ', issu, s ( u - n e i . l l I oiinsel sels
lor Eh . u l i l t l i o l i . i l p o u n d s l o t 11n,11nr i n d e p i - i u l e n l Ki OH 1 H \ \. K > I
i>' |.|> !•( .'I.) Oin- ol HH-M-. il, i l n , , . « i l l , . I . M i m i m ,1.', , , - i i t o U I - I I H I I I ol 111,
u n i o n s i - n i o ; i l \- ( i c
l o i , i i i ( - ih,- I i n p l o s n lo j.-ui- p n o n l \n
crnplov MU'nl to n u - n i l u r s u i l l , u i f . i k ' s l k - n i ' l l i o! i i n - i n t H ' i s h i p t . . i l i t - u K li.ts
hecn i-iiiiMili'ii'tl jirul foun,l lo IH- .1 X i h n l l l M ; i - » f l l .IN K l h K . ' i \ m l . i n , m

K i - s p < > m l , - n r ~ opl l . l l l .llso M o l . l l , - - . S,-l
S l l i l l I KM
because "n denies |ol> r e l e u a l s lo niinnit-tnl>fi\" ( l > i p 2 } } . if is.l.-.ii an.I
f i n d i h . n K , - s p o n , k m \*.is n.ii .i,le.|ii.ii.K .ippn.i-d ol t h i s issn.. no

restraining or coercing of employees in t h e i r r i g h t s
under Section 7 could nevertheless w i t h i m p u n i t N
penalize members for failing or refusint to participate
in a violation of a no-strike clause is to p r o v i d e an
incentive to unions and members to violate c o n t i a c t s .
This too runs counter to a basic policy of the s t a t u t e .
Accord: (jla:icrs Local Lnion ,\u. 1162, cic. / /'i<.\m (//in.v,
Inc.). I77NERH.W. 1 '-'
6. Respondent's basic defenses, as stated in its l e t t e r
memorandum to the Trial Examiner are: ( a ) that "if there
was any violation of the Act . . . it was cured both by t h e
arbitration process" and the Union's compliance w i t h the
arbitrator's award; and (b) that "in any event, the conduct
complained of and set forth in the complaint" was of s h o r t
duration and "tic minimi*) The short answer lo Respondent's second contention is t h a t the conduct aliened and
found to be violative is s u b s t a n t i a l and s i g n i f i c a n t ,
requiring remedial action. Thus, the record establishes t h a t
Respondent's insistence t h a t DeLuxe do all i t s hums; on
the basis of its union seniont\e made it impossible fot
the Employer to f i l l vacancies practically for the e n n r e
month of December. Moreover, Respondent did no!
rescind its September 1^70 resolution broadening the scopc
of the u n i o n seniority rule to employed n i e m b e i s ( f o i
"reversions" and transfers to higher classificationsl u n t i l
March 1972. Respondent continued to press itsdisciplir,.;; \s against
long aflei December 1S*7U. culminating in t h e i r expulsion
in March 1^71. despite the fact t h a t the December 2S
arbitral a w a r d upheld the Employer's position t h a t i t could
properly hire the two employees w i t h o u t regard to the
union seniority rule.
As to Respondent's contention t h a t its v i o l a t i o n s were
"cured" by the arbitr.il process and by its compliance with
the arbitrator's award t h e r c h v rendering umieccssar\d
superfluous the i n s t a n t u n f a i r labor practice pioccedmn
- Respondent relies on the Board's reccM Collver case.1-1
To begin w i t h . (W/ur is here inapplicable. 1'here. t h e
Hoard dismissed the complaint proceeding because of the
supposed availability of grievance-arbitration procedures
under the parties' collective agreement, u'sersing u n t o
itself, however, jurisdiction over the proceeding in the
event of t h a t he "e\pecl[ed] my orders and A w a u l s to be
stiiclly followed." 1 1 certain contingencies. U n l i k e in
Colh'cr, we are here concerned not w i t h defe:e:ue to
affouteil f u l l iipporliimu tn hue.ill- 11 SIT /c./. j/ /,-,'.' i ,••;• i M > SI K K
J i l l -Ml.. In IS. .S .S A,;,M,', i 1 , , v N I K H . 4 U - I .\ l.'.'s , , \,i
AccorUingl\o f i n d i n g s Jrc hasi-d mi i h i s pom! I ht- >.iuu- ;. h,:t- w n h
rcspci i k>General Counsel's contenlton ih.ii R r s p o u d v n i ' s u-fu^.i. to h.uullc
ot p i t K C s s gnc\.UKC> foi r i o n n u n i h c i ^ (and c\pt-iU-d i i u - i n h . i s i ts Mol.il:-.,
ol Si-i S | l > ) i l ) | M \ d i l M k - d K . !hr i-o!iip!.liill lll.uk- "..• Mu-li a l l i - i - . i ! - . ' - !
\k R c s p o n d c n l ' s ^ \ l l n t • s ^ . \. "jitinitli-vl" t h a t tin- I n i o n w o u k l not
. fir.!.
ship " I .
rcpi
tpu-p.
\pi-lli-il
on tin- !MSIS of l l u i r s t m i o i u ot itns smtilc
i l i . i i Ki-spoii.lt-in. as i h r i-v. l i i s i > . - rrpirMmUlite ol I > , | ,^,\.
w o u l v l f . u ! l o f u l f i l ! I K s L i i u i o i 1 , J u l \o i r p r c s r n l a l l i - n , ' > l . ' \ c c s i i i u i . . . ! i : i i noiiMii'lllbfisl. ,ihs.-:u . u K a t u c notac lo Rfspoiuk'nt t h a t i' wo;::.H- i\.- to
ntri-l sin h issu.-s Noi i s i h , ! , am showmj: t h a t Krspoiuk-nt ,-M-I u-li. -.1 10
[ t | > i t - s t - n t iioiinu-nil't i - w i t h i n I!K- K a r ^ a i m n ^ u n i t . L ndc-r I!K , IK i i n s t . i t n ; - s .
H-ra! ( iMinsd's ,l|>n| K .ition in h i s hncf (p 2('l -it t h i s Km- ilatv- "to .inn :i.l
llu
• fill.I
ih.•I" of « , l h
an Sd'H I »i \ \i 01: t h e hasis ol su, h ' pi ,s'!' is o, nu-,1
'•' ( ,.//!. f ln\u!Mf,l H m: •) < , » / / ,i'i.l l l , i , . - / i Vi >(.-»ni . o. pi.1 N l KM
No |sil
1 1 I o, Ilk,- H.IS.MI-. I u o u l d not i n OIIIII..-M.I l l i a l ll,,- II,-.o,I d . l r i lo
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notify and l>argam collectively with Del.uxe concerning
changes in terms and conditions of employment prior to
e f f e c t i n g such changes; t h a t it revoke Us disciplinary action
(expulsion) against employees Giovanelh and l a r d a l o and
restore to each of them union membership with f u l l union
seniority rights; and t h a t it make whole the employees
TiHuied in the complaint for any loss of earnings suffered
by them by reason of the discrimination against them. 1 ' 1
Backpay shall be computed in accordance with the
formula set forth in I H'. H'tmlvmrth Company, 90 N I . R H
389. with interest as described in Ixix Plunihin^ A Hcunn%
Co., I . 1 8 N I . R B 176.
Upon the foregoing f i n d i n g s of fact, conclusions of law.
and the entire record, and pursuanl to Section I0(c)of the
liv toicini: Del.uxe toAct.
LMVC Ipiioriu
employment
to recommended:
hereby missue
the following

arhitialion wheie a i b i t i . i t i o n piocecilings aie available.
Here the parlies submitted their basic dispute (applicability
of the u n i o n seniority r u l e ) to a r b i t r a t i o n . Moreover.
Respondent did no! raise a r b i t r a t i o n as a defense in its
answer to the complaint, did not seriously press it at the
hearint;. and voluntarily elected to l i t i g a t e the matters in
issue in the u n f a i r laboi practice proceeding. F i n a l l y , the
record here shows t h a t Respondent has ignored prior
arbitral awards, prompting the a r b i t r a t o r in his latest
(December 2S> a w a r d to deplore two e a r l i e r v i o l a t i o n s and
a d m o n i s h i n g Respondent
Accordingly. 1 conclude t h a t Respondent's defenses are
w i t h o u t m e r i t and lhe\e herehv rejected.
COM i I S I O N S oi |,A\.

emplovees w i t h greatest l e n g t h of membership, and bv
causing emplovees to reiect Del u x e ' s offers of employ
men! u n l e s s i h e v had such u n i o n s e n i o r i t y . Respondent
committed u n f . n t labor practices w i t h i n t h e meaning of
Section S ( h i ( hi \ anil (2 I of t h e \ c t .
2 Hv c . K i s i i i t 1 and a t l c m p l i n : ' to cause Del uxe not to
revet! 01 l i a n s t e t e m p l o y e e s M i n i , /urend.i. M a n n e l l i . and
Mor^.i:i to h i g h e r c l a s M l i c a t i o n s on the g i o u n d t h a t ihev
alle^edlv did n o t h a v e s u l l i c i e n l u n i o n s e m o i i t x . ResponJeii' l o m m i t t e d u n f a i r laboi piaehces w n h m t h e meaning
of Si\1 N h > i 2 i a n d I I K \ of t h e A c t .
liv s i i p . i l . u K causing Del.uxe to deny employment to
toriiiei cmplovccs Ciiovanelh. I'loski. a n d Cunningham
hei.iiisc i h e v al'cix'dlv had. i i i s u f l i c i e n l u n i o n seniontv.
Respondent c o m m i t t e d u n f a i i labor practices w i t h i n t h e
meainiit: ofScdion S ( h n 2 i a r d i l u \ l o f t h e Act.
-I Hv u m ' l a t c i a l l s c l f c c l i n t : chatit-'es in terms and
k-oP.d.'.ions ol c;r.plov i n c u t d n n i i f t h e lei m of U s c o l l e c t i v e
,i'j!iv:;icn! w i t h D e l ' r x e . R e s p . i i H l c n l committed u n f a i r
i.ihi-i p i . u t u es w u hi n t h e meamiiL' of Section S(b)i ,^i of t h e
\cl
•~ b\: and expelling Giosanclli and l a r d a l o
Tom m e m b e r s h i p u n d e i t h e i i i c u m s i a i i c e s described
M,;'"I.. si\. 51. R e s p o n d e n t c o m m i l l e i l u n f a i r laboi
. i i . i d i i c s \ \ i i l u a l l i e me.mint.' o l Scdion S ( b M l ) ( A ) o l t h e
Ac!
(' 1 . n i l of t h e a f o i e s a i c l u n f a ! labor [indices a f f e c t s
. i - m i n e i i c w i t h i n t l i e m e . i m n g o ! Section 2 ( < > i a n d ( 7 | o l
he \
I Ml

R l V | l Ml

mis i ICCISIOD entriiC'.1

1 1.)\' (ouinl th.il Respondent eiiL\i*jed in *.~ei l.in; unl.in

idior. lo e f l e c t u a l e t h e p o l i c i c s . i t ihe A c t 1 he a f f i r m a t i v e
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.Ml
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IwlH-tl

pll.'t

1 lank (i iovanclli
Rose I'l. iski
John ( 'unninghani

Mike Mannelli
( llll

t h a t ihe Respondent

Ul'.-:i-

1 lie Ki'llRMV

I c n v Mini
( ell /.ilicnda

aboi i - i . i i t i c c s . 1 s h a l l lecommend t h a t it be oideied to
ease a n d d.'sist t h e i e l r o m a n d t a k e c c i ; a i n a l l n m a u v e
a'tion w i l l nu'!i.,!c a ie.|iiii. :nc;it

ORD1.R"'
Respondent Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians.
I oca I 7 <>2. I n t e r n a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e of ' T h e a t r i c a l Stage
l-inplo\ees and Moving F'icture Machine Operators of the
United Slates anil Canada. A l l . CIO, its officers, agents.
and Representatives, s h a l l :
1. ( ease and desist f i o r n :
( a I hnforcing. i m p l e m e n t i n g , and giving effect to i t s
u n i o n s e m o r i t \, as set lorth in article 27 of its b y l a w s .
In lorcmi; Del u x e G e n e r a l . Incorporated, to give priority
in employment to emplovces w i t h greatest l e n g t h of
m e m b e r s h i p and hs c a u s i n g employees to reject Del.uxe's
o f f e i s of e m p l o y m e n t unless they h a v e requisite union
seniority.
( b i Causing or a t t e m p t i n g to cause D e l . u x e to d i s c r i m i n a t e in the h u e . transfer, ami u p g r a d i n g of employees in
violation of Section 8(a)i3) of the Act.
(c) Unilaterally, anil w i t h o u t notice 01 c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
the above-named employer, e f f e c t i n g changes in terms and
conditions of emplo\.
(d) Disciplining, im h i d i n g expelling employees from
membership, lor a n c p t m L ' o f f e r s of employment in
accordance w i t h practices and procedures sanctioned h\s
collective agreement w i t h Del.uxe.
(e) In a n v other m a n n e r restrainm;: or coercing its
employees in the exeicise of rights guaranteed b> Section 7
of the Act.
2 . l a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g a f f n m a t i v e a c t i o n necessary t o
e f f e c t u a t e the policies o| t h e A c t .
(a) M a k e w h o l e the employees listed below l u i an\s
of pay they mav h a v e s u f f e r e d because of the discrimination ai'.mist t h e m , in the m a n n e r set forth in t h e section of

I.-
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( h ) Upon request, bargain collectively in good f a i t h with
Del.u.xe prior to effecting changes in terms anil conditions
of employment.
(c) Rescind its expulsion of employees John C u n n i n g ham anil Gloria l a r d a l o from u n i o n membership; restore
the said employees to membership w i t h f u l l union seniority
rights; expunge from its records all reference and other
evidence in its files relating to t h e disciplinary actions
against t h e m ; and n o t i f y each in w r i t i n g of all such actions.
( d ) N o t i f y , in w r i t i n g . Respondent's lnternation.il to
which the two above-named employees have appealed their
expulsion, of the aforesaid actions, w i t h a copy of such
writing to the two employees
(e) Preserve and. upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, fur examination 01 copying, all records
relevant and necessary to compliance with above paragraph ( a ) .
(f) Post at its business office and m e e t i n g halls, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix " ' • Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 2. a f t e r being d u l y signed by Respondent's
representative, s h a l l he posted by il immediately upon
receipt thereof, and he m a i n t a i n e d hy il for 60 consecutive
days t h e r e a f t e r , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are c u s t o m a r i l y posted. Reasonable steps shall he taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or coveted by any o t h e r
material
(g) F u r n i s h the Regional Director for Region 2 signed
copies of said notices for posting by Del uxe General.
Incorporated, if w i l l i n g , in places w h e r e notices to
employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notices,
on forms provided by said Regional Director, shall, a f t e r
being signed by Respondent, he f o r t h w i t h returned to the
Regional Director for disposition by h i m .
(h) N o t i f y said Regional Director, in w r i t i n g , w i t h i n 20
days from the receipt of t h i s Decision, what steps have
been taken to comply h e r e w i t h . ' ^
I t is i t R I I I I K O K D I K I D that t h e c o m p l a i n t h e dismissed
in all other respects.

Pursuant to the recommended Order of a I rial L \.mimer
of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to
effectuate the policy of the N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Act.
as amended, we hereby notify you t h a t :
Wi w i l l M M enforce, implement, a n d g i v e e f f e c t t o
our u n i o n seniority rule (as set forth in a r t 2" of out
b y l a w s ) by forcing Del uxe General. Incorporated, to
give priority in employment to employees w i t h greatest
length of membership and by causing employee- to
reject Del.uxe's offers of employment unless t h e y had
requisite union semorit\
Wh wit i sot cause, or attempt to cause. Dcl.uxe to
discriminate in the hire, transfer, and u p g r a d i n g of
employees in violation of Section S ( a > ( . ^ > of t h e
N a t i o n a l Labor Relations Act
Wi win soi u n i l a t e r a l l y , and w i t h o u t nonce or
Consultation w i t h the above-named h m p l < ' \ e r . e f f e c t
changes in terms and c o n d i t i o n s of employment.
\V't w i l l , sol discipline, i n c l u d i n g expel from
membership, members accepting employment in .u
cordance w i t h procedures sanctioned h\m a s ' i c c m e i i t
w i t h Del.uxe.
Wi w i l l make w h o l e t h e employees listed below loi
any earnings they may h . i \ lost as the r e s u l t ol out
objections to their transfer, u p g r a d i n g or h u e . because
of enforcement of our u n i o n seniority r u l e in I )ecember
1970.

Terry M i n i
Ceil Zurenda
Mike Marinelh
Cliff Moruan

Prank Gio\anell
Rose Ploski
John

Wl w i l t , upon request, bargain in g xv.1 f a i t h w i t h
DeLuxe prior ti> effecting changes in t e r n s and
conditions of employment.
Wl w n i rescind our order expelling f r a n k C n o \ a nelli and Ciloria LardaUi from u n i o n membership and
17 In the c \ e n t th.it the Ho.ud's Older i* enloued h\1 lndu'incm "I a
restoreI ahor
to Relations
said employees
l l u"I'uMcd
n i o n semorr.v
nizhts.
L'niteJ M.Ik's ( u n i t of Appeals t h e uords in the m i m e leadliij! "Posted h\r .if the Saturn.•!
Ho.nd" s h . i l lf uic.nl
pursuant

to a J i u l f i u c n ! of the I mtcJ Slates ( o n i l of Appeals en (on nit .in ( l u l c i ol
the National l.jhor Kel.ilions Ho.ml "
l v In iht e v e n ! 1tl.it t h i s recommended Onler is adopled In the Hoard,
t h i s pn>M-ion s h a l l lie modified l o i c . n l "SouK said Krfinii.il Direuor. in
wrilmj! w i t h i n III d a \ I n u n I h i - d a l e ol tlus O i d e i . w h a t slops Respondent
has taken l o i o t i i p k h e i c w ilh
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An Agency of the U n t i e d Slates Government
I o all members of Motion Picture Laboratory T e c h n i cians, Local 702, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e of t h e a t r i c a l Stage
l.mployees and Moving Picture M a c h i n e Opcialors of the
U n i t e d Stales a n d Canada. A l l ( T O

Ol'l K A I M K s Ml I III I s l I I l i
Si A l I s \ s p ( ys yn \
A l l CIO
(Labor Oruam/ation)

(Repiesenlatixe)

I I HIM

IATSB, LOCAL 702

Ins is an official notice and niusl not he defaced by

one
his notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
n the date of posting and must not he altered, defaced.
•overed by any other material. Any questions concern-
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ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may hedirected to the Board's Office. 36th Floor. Federal
Building. 2(> Federal I'la/a. New York. New York I(XX)7,
Telephone 212 264 3311.
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i v\T ARBITRATO

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Guffanti Film Laboratory
and
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

Opinion
and
Award

The Company contends that due to an error Ernest LaBracca

I

and James Havlland were overpaid in wages. The Company seeks
recoupment.
In the case of LaBracca the Company seeks the right to recover the overpayment by making deductions from his wages.

In

the case of Raviland the Company deducted what it claims he
owes from his severance pay upon his recent retirement.

The

Company seeks affirmation of the right to have done so.

i

Factually the LaBracca case is on all fours with the facts

in Case No. 69-A 27, Local 702, Motion Picture Film Technicians !
and Movlelab, Inc. Hence my Award in that case, namely that the j
Company is entitled to repayment by the employee of the amount
of wages overpaid him, is applicable to the instant case.

i
However, in the instant case, unlike its position in Movielab
I

the Union advanced the defense among others, that Section 193 of
the Labor Law of the State of New York allows only certain spec- [
i
ified deductions from an employee's wages. And that deductions
for overpayment of wages is not among them. The Union argues
that Section 193 thereby bars the Company from making deductions'
from Mr. LaBracca*s wages to liquidate the amount of overpayment.

- 2I need not Interpret Section 193 of the Labor Law, because I am satisfied that repayment to the Company can be
achieved without the Company unilaterally making deductions
from Mr. LaBracca's wages.

I rule that Mr. LaBracca's proper

rate of pay was as a Shipper (c).

I do not find that he was

either classified as or performed the duties of Head Shipper
(d), nor, because he was not a Shipper, Checker and Packer (b)
was he entitled to a 51 wage increase for "foreign shipments."
I find accordingly that he was overpaid by the Company in the
amount of $778.70. He owes that total amount of money to the
Company.

i

The Company shall not unilaterally make deductions

from his wages.

Instead I direct that he and/or the Union on his
iI
behalf arrange with the Company a mutually agreeable method of
repayment together with the other considerations to which I
made reference in my Movielab Award. However if the parties
are unable to agree upon a method of repayment within twenty
days from the date of this Award, the matter may be referred
back to me for determination as to how repayment is to be made.
The Haviland case is different.

Based on the evidence

before me I am persuaded that Mr. Haviland had reasonable
grounds to believe that the work he performed, namely "Jiffy
Tests," were "Reprints" and higher classified work.

And that

after performing that particular work for the requisite contractual period of time, he had reasonable grounds to apply
for a permanent upward reclassification.
Mr. Havialnd was told by his steward that Jiffy Tests
entitled him to a (c) Positive Joining Department rate.

For

thirteen weeks he performed that work and noted it as "reprint"

- 2on his card. He was paid at the higher rate without the Company
questioning it. Thereafter, consistent with the contract, he
applied for and was reclassified upward to the (c) rate, again
without question, refutation or inquiry by the Company, and
was paid at the higher rate for almost two years up to his retirement.
To my mind this is persuasive evidence of the reasonableness of Mr. Havlland's belief that he was properly paid the
higher rate for the Jiffy Test work and was entitled to a permanent upward adjustment in his wage rate. Whether he was
correct in fact is Immaterial.

For it seems to me that after

the first thirteen weeks, at the point that he was officially
I

reclassified upward, or within a reasonable time thereafter
the Company had the opportunity and should have protested or
eliminated the higher payment or at least looked into the bonafides of the upward reclassification it made. That it did not
means to my mind that the disputed work was higher rated, or
if not, by failing to take steps to correct the wage payment
for such an extended period of time it acquiesced in Mr. Haviland's reasonable belief that he was being properly paid.
Accordingly the Company did not have the right to deduct
$345.70 from Mr. Haviland's severance pay upon retirement. The
Company Is directed to return to Mr. Haviland that sum of money.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Agreement between the above parties and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the paties, makes the following
AWARD:

- 4Ernest LaBracca owes the Company a total of $778.70
in over payment of wages. He and/or the Union on
his behalf and the Company shall work out a mutually
agreeable method of repayment together with the details of any tax effect. Failing to do so within
twenty days from the date of this Award the matter
may be referred back to me for determination of how
repayment is to be made.
James Haviland was not overpaid in wages by the Company. Accordingly the Company did not have the right
to deduct $345.70 from his severance pay upon retirement. The Company shall return that sum of money to
him.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally by the
parties.

Eric y. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator!

DATED: October 30, 1972
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York) " "
On this 30th day of October, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me thj^t h^-e^ceprted
the same.
Case No. 72-A 6
Case No. 72-A 7

Noto-> Put'- S;o' 8 "e'Ne» York
No 4 1 II7C300
Qualt'itd ir C..TC-.S County
3-
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CIVIL COURT OP THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OP NEW YORK
--- .--------------X
OUFFAKTI FILM LABORATORIES INC.,

:

Plaintiff, :

5

Index No. 24762/73

6
7

ERNEST LA BRACCA,
Defendant . :

8

X

9
10

S T I P U L A T I O N

11
12
13
14
15

Before:
HON. SHANLEY N . EGETH, Judge.
A p p e a r a n c e s :
Messrs.

16
\7
18

Trial term,
Part 40,
111 Centre Street,
March 19, 1973-

By:

POLSTTI, FREIDIN PRASHKER FELDHAN & GARTNER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
777 Thlrc Avenue,
New Yor-l;, New York.
ED*'ARD F. BEANS, ESQ.., of Counsel.

19

ERNEST LA BRACCA, Pro Se,
Defendant,

20

Brooklyn, New Yorlc.

21
22

643 46tn Street,
Stuart Flshmar.,
Official Court
Reporter.

23
24
25

P

1

1
2

S T I P U L A T I O N
E R N E S T

LA

BRACCA,

2
called as a witness

3

on behalf of the defendant, having been duly sworn

4

by the Court, testified as follows:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE WITNESS:

9

Erreet LaBracca.
Where do you reside?
6^3 48tn Street,

Brooklyn, New York.
THE COURT:

10
11

State your name.

Put your stipulation

on the record.
MR. BEAKS:

12

V.j name is Edward F.

13

Beane.

I am. with the firm of Polettl,

14

Freldln, Prashker, Feldraar. & Gartner

15

appearing for the Plaintiff in this matter.
THE COURT:

16

Sir, you have spoken

17

to the lawyer for the Plaintiff in this

18

matter?

19

MR. LABRACCA: Yes.

20

THE COURT: You have worked out a

21

time payment plan with the attorney for

22

the Plaintiff.

23
24
25

Is that correct?

MR. LAERACCA: Yes, with a stipulation that if I miss a payment —
THE COURT: I am taking care of that.

1

S T I P U L A T I O N

2
3

I

MR. LABRACCA:

I an, not working

right now.

4
5

3

THE COURT:

You have agreed to pay

him a down payment?

6

KR. LABRACCA:

7

MR. B£AK£:

No down payment.

Your Honor, if I may,

8

Kr. Labracca is entitled to a $40.00 cre-

9

dit from Guffantl Film Laboratories. We

10

are considering the $40.00 credit as a

11

down payment.

12

THE COURT:

Fine.

You are giving

13

him a credit of $40.00 towards the entire

14

amour.t, as of now.

15
16
17

.

KR. BEANE:

Yes.

THE COURT: When is the first
payment to commence?

IB

MR. LABRACCA: June 1st, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: How are they to be paid?

20

MR. LABRACCA:

21

THE COURT: Then you agree to pay

$10.00 per week.

22

$10.00 per week beginning June 1st.

23

MR. LABRACCA: Yes.

24

TH£ COURT: Each week you will give

25

him $10.00 until this ie paid off.

1

S T I P U L A T I O N

2

la that correct?

3

MR. LABRACCA:

4

THE COURT:

It

Ye*.

In the event that

5

there is a default Ir. any of the weekly

6

payments, which shall continue uncured

7

for a period of three weeks following

8

written notice of default to him, from

9

you, by certified mall, return receipt

10

requested, you may then docket a Judgment

11

for the unpaid balance crediting the

12

monies paid on account.

Is that correct?

13

MR. BEANE: That's correct.

14

THE COURT: That's your understand-

15

ing?

I
16

MR. BEANE: Yes, your Honor.

17

TH2 COURT:

You won't have to

18

make a motion to get that docketed. You

19

can subir.it an affidavit to the Cler*c of

20

the Court setting forth the circumstances

21

of the default.

I
Do you understand that?

22

MR. BEANS:

Yes.

23

THE COURT:

Is that your understanding?

.24
25

MR. LABRACCA: Yes, air.

1
S T I P U L A T I O N

5

2

THE COURT:
3

*

The natter la settled.
•

•

4
5

Certified to be a true and correct
record of the within stipulation.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

f

22
23
24
25

Stuart Fishraan,
Official Court Reporter.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
'Cinef fects yColor Laboratory, Inc.
OPINION

and
AND

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

AWARD
CASE #72Q2

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties;
and having duly considered the evidence presented, renders the
following Opinion and Award:

For at least the last five years under the
terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement, and with the knowledge of and
without objection from the Union, bargaining
unit maintenance mechanics have been periodically
and regularly assigned to and have performed
certain work in the "Optical Section". As to
that particular work (the disputed work herein)
this consistent practice, over an extended period
of. time during which successive collective agreements were negotiated, pierced and eliminated
any "corporate veil" between the~C6rapany~anc the
Crneffects, Inc. (a sisTter corporation at the
same*location) and effectively classif.iea_jEhe
disputed^work ^performed by the""maintenance
mechanics at the Cineffects, Inc. or Optical
Section location as bargaining unit work under
the collective agreement between~"tRe Company and
Union even though Cinelfects, Inc. as a corporate
entity~is a not a^sigliatorjy'"to'the~c~61itract".'
Accordingly I render the following AWARD:
1. The maintenance mechanics have no
right to refuse to accept or to refuse
to perform, and the Union has no right
to direct them to refuse assignments of
work which maintenance mechanics have
previously performed in the Optical Section.

-22. When so assigned during the life of
the collective bargaining agreement and
under its terms and conditions, the maintenance mechanics shall continue to perform that particular work.
3. If the Union's notice directing employees not to perform the work is still
posted the Union shall remove that notice
forthwith. If the Union does not do so,
the Company may remove the notice.
4. The Arbitrator's fee and expenses
shall be borne by' the Union.

Eric/U. Schmertz

\t Ar

DATED: February 12th, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 12th day of February, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
MAUR.CE L SCHOE""'M.D

ii:JC. SUT: or TIE., row.
NO. 3WE:"j7:5

ty ,/
QuINi. t' ill HWSJU County
T*n Him" Mir Ji 30.
tf
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, IATSE
AFL-CIO
and

•

Award
Case No. 72A10

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proof; and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Employer has violated the contract by requiring
a single employee to run both the Total Vision Step
Printer and the Hollywood Printer in the 8mm Department. The Employer shall no longer require a single
operator to run both machines.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the/Employer.

Eric J., Schmertz
I
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: March ^> 1973
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of March, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to nie tc be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

MAURICE I. EC C-Ff'WAU
NOTARY PUbLIC. ".run OF NEW YORK
No. 3 ' . f c - 9 7 1 5
Qualifies in nassiu County /
Tw» Expires Marcti 30, 197f

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, IATSE
AFL-CIO
and
Movielab, Inc.

Opinion
Case No. 72A10

The stipulated issue is;
Whether the Employer has violated the contract
by requiring a single employee to run two machines in the 8mm Department, i.e. one Hollywood
Printer, and one Total Vision Step Printer? If
so what shall be the remedy?
Hearing;; were held on November 21 and November 27, 1972.
Thereafter the parties submitted briefs.
The Union's principal argument is that the Employer violated Sections 17(d) and (b) of the contract.

I find the Union's

case to be meritoreous.
The Total Vision Step Printer was placed in operation "ignificantly earlier than the Hollywood Printer.

Prior to the

introduction of the Hollywood Printer, the operation of the
Total Vision Step Printer was the sole and exclusive duty of
the operator of that machine, and I find it to have been a
"present method of (machine) operation" within the meaning of
Section 17(b) of the contract.
Thereafter (perhaps two years later) the Employer introduced the Hollywood Printer, which I find to be a "new" machine within the meaning of Section 17(d) of the contract.

The

Employer concedes it did not notify the Union in writing when
the Hollywood Printer was placed in production, as required
by Section 17(d).

- 2 The application of Section 17(d), in the instant case with
the introduction of the Hollywood Printer, expressly brings
into play the provisions of Section 17(b).

Obviously the Employ-

er should not benefit by relying on his failure to give notice
under 17(d) to avoid the express interrelationship of Sections
17(d) and 17(b).
When the operator of the Total Vision Step Printer was also
assigned the additional job of operating the subsequently introduced Hollywood Printer, a change in "operations from a single
to a dual operation of machines, so that one operator may operate two machine?" took place.

That language of Section 17(b)

makes no distinction as to which types of machines, when operated by a single operator, constitute a "dual operation;"
Therefore I am persuaded that the phrase "dual operation" is not
limited to the operation of two of the same type machines. Instead I am satisfied it encompasses the assignment to a single
operator, of the responsibility of running two machines whether
those machines are the same or different types. Hence when the
operator of the Total Vision Step Printer, also required to run
the Hollywood Printer, a "dual operation of machines" by one
operator was effectuated within the meaning of Section 17(b).
Section 17(b) allows for a change from a single to a dual
operation of machines "provided such dual operation is presently
or may hereafter be in existence in a laboratory operating under
a collective agreement with the Union." Testimony offered by
the Union that a dual operation of the Total Vision Step Printer
and the Hollywood Printer neither existed in any laboratory cov-

- 3 ered by the contract when the contract was negotiated nor subsequently, was not disputed by the Employer.

Accordingly the

condition under which the Employer is allowed to unilaterally
effectuate this type of dual operation of machines was not and
has not been met.
Therefore the Employer is directed to discontinue the dual
operation by a single operator of the Total Vision Step Printer
and Hollywood Printer.

The Operator shall no longer be requir-

•

•
ed to run both machine?.

Eric
Permanent Arbitrator

V.

\
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Cinneffects Color Laboratories
Award
Case No. 73A1

and

Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702 IATSE
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The time limit for rendition of the Award as aet forth
in Section 15(b) of the contract vas waived.
There is just cause for the discharge of Dennis Torres.
In accordance with Section 15(f) of the contract,
which provides that the fee and expenses of the
Arbitrator shall be paid by the losing party, the
Arbitrator's fee and expenses in the amount of
$2000. shall be borne by the Union. To expedite payment thereof (which the Arbitrator believes he has the
right to expect) said sum shall be paid to the Arbitrator by the Company, and the Union shall reimburse
the Company in that amount.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator"
DATED: April 16. 1973
STATE OF Raw York ),, .
COUNTY OF Hew York)
|.
1

On this 16th day of April, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Erie J. Schmerts to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case Mo. 73A1

-f

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

i1 Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
•Technicians, I.A.T.S.E. AFL-CIO
li
and
I DUART LABORATORIES

\!

' AWARD

and OPINION

Case #73A-2

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement in failing to make
proper wage payments to Orlando Temple?
If so what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on July 17, 1973 at which time Mr.
•I Temple, hereinafter referred to as "the gr levant" and repres"
•*•.
j| entatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded
>)

r

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
•\! and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath and the
M

<' contract time limit for rendition of the Award were expressly
waived.

.1

The grievance is denied.

I find that the disputed 25 cents

and hour attached to certain work performed within the Expediter
classification, and that the grievant first received that
i
;

additional sum when and because he performed "CBS" expediting

- in that classification.

:

:t

Based on the record before me I find that the grievant
agreed to assume the Expediter classification in January, 1967
provided he continued to receive his higher Negative B rate of
pay plus a shift differential.

The 25 cents in addition thereto

was not part of his pay when he was a Negative B worker but was
. added to the rate he carried over from that classification when
he comnenced work as an Expediter, because it was expressly and

•

-7 -•^-•^-, i«-J*S-^--.- "-.^-S^f- - -'-^ -V" • ' '

--

I

,.

uniquely applicable to the work of the latter classification and '
"authorized by CBS."

Therefore I consider it immaterial, whether !
t
'
j: as a payroll error as contended by the Company, or otherwise,
i
H

that he retained the 25 cents an hour after he returned to the

I! Negative

B classification in September, 1967 and for an extended
I
ij period of time thereafter. The fact is that inasmuch as the
'I
•
'
!| additional 25 cents attached to and was paid for certain Expediter
i
1 work, he acquired no contract right to that additional pay when,
jj as now, he is no longer in the Expediter classification.

Though

rj the Company may not recoup any such payments during the period he
• worked as a Negative B worker following his word as an Expediter,
d
i it is not now required to continue such payments from May 18, 1970
when he resumed the Negative B classification following a period
ii
X
!l|of time as a Printer No. 3.
i

Whether he would again be entitled to the additional 25 cents

h

,if and when he is reclassified as an Expediter is not presently
''before me and therefore need not be decided until and unless that
isituation occurs.
•|

The Arbitrator's fee and expenses totalling $210 (represents

ing one half-day hearing, one-half day for preparation of this
HAward, and room rental at the American Arbitration Association)
shall be borne by the Union.

':
~
Eric J; Schmertz
DATED: August 3, 1973
Arbitrator
'STATE OF New York )ss.
.COUNTY OF New York Y^."
'
On this fir-fft day of August, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

— ' - - "
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TPERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 1ATSE
Opinion
and
Award
Case *73A 11

and
Movielab, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:

Was there just cause for the discharge of
Louis Chiocgo? If not, what shall be the
remedy?——
Hearings were duly held.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross *x«qitTW witnesses. The Arbitrator's oath and the
time for rendition of the Award were waived.
I find Mr. Chiocco, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," to have been negligent in two respects.

First, consid-

ering his many years of service and experience as a Developer,
he should have been able to make an adequate hand splice even
while the machine was running.

Second, I am persuaded that

he should have known that a "flash test" was running through
the Developing machine at that time and should have stopped
the Machine to Bake the splice.

He should have known that the

safer procedure would have been to stop the machine to insure
making a satisfactory splice, in order not to endanger the
original negative which followed.

His failure on either or

both counts resulted In irreparable damage to the original
negative.
However, considering the grlevant's long period of em-

- 2 -

ployment and the fact that only recently has he experienced
difficulty with his work resulting in two warnings prior to
the instant incident, I conclude that the penalty of discharge
is too severe.

Rather I shall fashion what I consider to be

a proper remedy as set forth below.
Accordingly the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties, makes the following Award:
Louis Chlocco shall be restored to work without
back pay, but with his seniority intact. He shall
not return to an original negative Developer's job.
Rather the Company shall place him on a different
Developing job of its choosing, even if a reduction in pay is necessary. Following six months
of satisfactory service in the job in which he is
placed, Mr. Chlocco shall be permitted to exercise
his seniority to return to an original negative
Developer's job.
The Arbitrator's fee for three days of hearing and
one day for study and preparation of the Award and
Opinion shall be shared equally by the parties.

Eric 4- Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: November 19, 1973
STATE OF New York )88 .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 19th day of November, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Cineffects Color

Laboratory

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated
the collective bargaining agreement
in failing to make proper wage payments to Joseph Ltnton, and if so,
what shall the remedy be?
Hearings were held on February 18, March 6 and April 8,
1975 at which time Mr. Linton, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was expressly waived.

Based on the record before me I am not persuaded that rhs
grievant is performing duties beyond his job classification of
can

carrier to the extent that would warrant an increase in pay

or reclassification

to vault man or expediter.

There are no formal descriptions of the jobs covered by
the collective bargaining agreement.

The evidence advanced by

the grievant and the Union on his behalf is inadequate to conclud;
that his duties in connection with carrying cans containing
negative film; the delivery of such cans to the vault room and

I
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placement on racks therein; or their delivery to printing or

. ^fe'vs: •--.. "

other departments are outside the can carrier classification
flKSftftrV^

.' '

or significantly different from what is done by can carriers
paid at the can carrier rate at other laboratories covered by
this collective bargaining agreement.

Moreover it is undisputed

that these duties about which the grievant complains have been
part of his job assignment, and have not changed, since he was
first employed by this Employer in September, 1971.
While there is some evidence that some of these duties

expediter does, I am not satisfied that the grievar.t performs

\y on oc

;

that type of work either in quantity or with frequency that
would be necessary for an upward reclassification or an increase '
in pay.

Therefore the claim for pay at the vault man or expediter'
rate, or reclassification to either of those jobs, is denied.
However in the course of the hearing it was disclosed
that the grievant may not be receiving an extra five cents an
hour to which he is entitled for handling raw stock..

!

The Employer

and the Union shall look further into this matter, and if as it

||
i
appears, the grievant should have been receiving four dollars an !
i

hour instead of three dollars and ninety five cents an hour, the '•
employer shall make him whole retroactively as is appropriate.

-3-

be
and th. Employer.

-•
.

Eric,
«. Permanent Arbitrator
I

DATED: April 10, 1975
STATE OF New York )es .
COUNTY OF New York ) "

;

I
)

On this tenth day of April, 1975, before me personally '
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me '
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing '
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same, j

Public. S!»U cf Na« Tort
No. 24-4504976
Quitted in
ComiS»> Expire
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E

OPINION

•

and

and

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

AWARD

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer paid employees
on vacation commencing October 1,
1974 at the wrong rate under the contract? If so what shall be the remedy?
The Union withdrew with prejudice a grievance contending

j
j

that the Employer violated the contract by not paying holiday
I
pay, November 28th and November 29th, 1974 or birthday pay to
those employees on vacation at that time.

i
I

Employees commencing vacations on and after October 1, 1974'
were paid by the Employer at the rates of pay in effect and
applicable to their job classification between the period May 1
1

through April 30, 1974.

It is the Employer's position that the

"vacation year" for purposes of calculating the proper vacation

\>

i
'

pay is period May 1 through April 30th of the year in which the j
i
vacation is taken, and that this has been his practice since
i
June 27th, 1974 when the Union insisted on that interpretation of

i
the contract in settling a grievance involving one George Flammer.
The Union's contention is simply that vacation pay is to
be paid at the rate which the employee is earning at the time

-2-

the vacation is taken.

The instant dispute arises because on

and after October 1, 1974 the rates of pay of the affected
employees were higher than the pay rates they received during
the .preceding period May 1 through April 30th,

This case is

novel in that the positions of the parties herein are complete- |
ly opposite the respective positions they took in the settlement
of the Flammer vacation pay grievance in June of 1974.

At that!

time the Union told the Employer that Flammer was entitled to
vacation pay at the May 1 through April 30th rate, which was a
higher rate because it included a shift differential than his
pay rate when he went on vacation.

(He had changed shifts in

i
the interim and the shift differential was not longer applicable^

Prior to that grievance the Employer had followed the practice
of paying vacations at the rate an employee received when he
took his vacation.

But, on the Union's insistence, the Employer

agreed to pay Flammer at his higher May 1 to April 30th rate.
The Employer confirmed the Flammer settlement in a letter dated
June 27, 1974 and took the opportunity therein to further inform the Union that henceforth it would pay vacation pay,"based;
on (the) classification rate of pay....that is in effect during
the May to May period plus shift premium....to conform with
your request."

In short whereas the Union now seeks vacation

j

j
i
I
pay at an employee's rate when the vacation is taken, it sought
a different application for Flammer in 1974; and whereas the
Employer prior to June, 1974 followed the practice sought by

- rf.'-.
'
«
&
.

:'..J?v

-3the Union in this arbitration, now argues that the Flammer
settlement is binding and constitites a jointly agreed to interpretation of the vacation pay section of the contract.
In further arguing its case the Employer suggests that
by virtue of the Union's position in the Flammer matter, as a
consequence of the Flammer settlement and the Employer's
letter of June 27, 1974 advising as to how the vacation pay
provision would thereafter be applied, the Union has "hoisted
itself on its own petard" and is now estopped from seeking a
new and different contract interpretation.
As the parties well know the Arbitrator is bound to the
language of the contract, where that language is clear . xAn prio:

bi-laterally negotiated grievance settlement oreven a prior
practice contrary to the clear contract language, is immaterial
to how the contract is to be interpreted now.^f find that to
be the situation here. The Flammer case was a grievance
settlement at variance from otherwise clear contract terms.
The Employer suggests that it was more than simply a grievance !
I
settlement, but a bi-laterally agreed to interpretation of the
vacation provision of the contract prospectively, or in other
words a negotiated contract change.

I do not agree. As I see ;
ii
it the Union sought vacation pay for Flammer at the May to
i
i
April 30th rate because it was a higher rate of pay than he was!
earning when he went on vacation.

The Arbitrator did not

participate in that grievance settlement. The Employer was not

-4required to accept or accede to the Union's interpretation of
the contract at that time.

It could have

continued its pract-

ice of paying for vacations at the rate the employee earned
when he took his vacation, and had the Employer done so this
Arbitrator would have upheld its position had the matter been
grieved and submitted to arbitration.

If the Union "hoisted

itself on its own petard", so did the Employer, by agreeing
to a method for the payment of vacation pay that differed from
the clear contract language when it was not required to do so.
Therefore I view the Flammer grievance as nothing more than the
settlement of a single dispute, by mutual agreement and on terms
j
different from the wording and intent of the contract. Nor,
contrary to the Employer's position can its June 27, 1974 letter
be construed prospectively as a bi-laterally negotiated or
agreed to contract interpretation or modification.

i
Though the :

Employer notified the Union that henceforth it would apply the '
vacation pay provisions of the contract as the Union had re-

;

quested in the Flammer matter, that statement by the Employer |
was not affirmatively accepted by the Union.

The Employer

!
!

argues that because the Union did not respond to that letter or
dispute or reject the Employer's notification of how he intend-'
ed to apply the

vacation pay provisions of the contract in the

future, it constituted agreement to that new approach.

If the

contract language was unclear or ambiguous I would agree with
the Employer's argument in that regard.

But otherwise the

Employer's expansion of the Flammer grievance settlement to

,•

-5-

i
i

include a different vacation pay formula prospectively for all
employees was only unilateral and self-serving, and could not

•

go beyond the Flammer case to either a binding interpretation
|
;

of the contract or a modification thereof unless there was
positive and affirmative agreement by the Union.
the Union's silence cannot be so

In this case'

construed.

Obviously the foregoing hinges on the foundational
premise that the contract language is clear and unambiguous.
I am satisfied that it is.

!
"

Section 6(b) provides in pertinent

part that:
"Vacation pay shall be at an employee's
regular rate of pay including shift
premium."
Nowhere in Section 6 is there a provision calculating

[

vacation pay at an employee's rate between May 1 and April 30th
i
of the vacation year. Had the parties intended to measure
vacation pay by the rate paid during that period they could
have easily so provided somewhere in Section 6.

|
i
But they did j

not.
Nor can I read the Employer's interpretation within the
provisions of 6(d) of the contract.

That Section deals with

i
specific circumstances; for example, the rate of vacation pay i
ii
when an employee has worked in different classifications dur- j
r

ing the year and has accumulated 130 or more days in the higher
classification.

In that specific and limited instance Section

6(d) grants him vacation pay at the higher classified rate.
And in similar limited fashion 6(d) provides an apportionment

' J- .

-6-

»

in vacation pay between the higher rate and a lower classified
i
I
rate when an employee works more than 65 but less than 130
i
days in the higher rated classification.

But 6(d) does not

provid'e for the payment of vacation pay generally, at the
I

rate an employee earned between May 1 and April 30th, and to •
read that into the otherwise specific and narrow provisions

]

of Section (d) is to do by gross indirection what the parties ,
could and should have done clearly and directly had they intended the first sentence of Section (b) ("vacation pay shall
be at an employee's regular rate of pay ....") to mean not his
I
rate when he took his vacation but a different and earlier
i
rate during the period May 1 to April 30th.

Indeed among the •

possible interpretations of 6(d) is that it represents an ex- '
plicit and limited exception to the otherwise applicable rule
i
that an employee receives vacation pay at the rate he is earning at the time he takes his vacation.

For example, if when

he takes his vacation an employee is classified in a lower

:

rated job, but during the vacation year ending April 30th he
worked 130 or more days in a higher classification, then, as

-

an exception, he would receive vacation pay at the higher

I

classified rate.

;
i

In that particular event, if an employee

would not otherwise get vacation pay at this rate at the time
he went on vacation, this exception would be unnecessary.

I

cite this example not to suggest that 6(d) supports the Union's
case herein, but rather that it can cut both ways and therefore,
neither by language nor intent does it provide an answer to
the instant dispute. It covers a different problem and does

|

-7not change the first sentence of 6(b).
Consequently, therefore, the first^sentence of 6(b)
remains clear, and subject only to one logical interpretation.
It means what is says, namely that an employee's vacation pay!
shall be his regular rate of pay including shift premium.
An employee's regular rate of pay, for vacation purposes,
must be the rate he is earning when he takes his vacation.
Absent any other definition, explanation or relevant modification, no other interpretation is realistic. And I have
found no other modifications, definitions or explanations in
the contract or by virtue of the settlement of the Flammer
matter.
Accordingly the Union's grievance is granted.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer paid employees on vacation
commencing October 1, 1974 at the wrong
rate under the contract. The Employer
should have paid the employees vacation
pay at the regular rates of pay including
shift premium which they were earning at
the time they commenced their vacations.
The Employer shall make appropriate pay
adjustments.
The arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally.

Eric./. Schmerts
Permanent Arbitrator

- • .r"
'*'•',
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DATED: December iff, 1975
STATE OF New York. )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)

~
On this twenty fri*eth day of December, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

Hour, PuWic. Sttti ol Hwi t«*
Ho. 2445M97*
ta Kmp Count»

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD

Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and
Radiant Laboratory, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Shale Dworan? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on March 31, April 5, April 8 and April
14, 1976, at which time Mr. Dworan, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant", and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath and the contractual time limit \r rendi

The grievant is charged with negligently causing scratches
on a negative film.

The Company asserts that this offense,

coupled with the grievant's prior disciplinary record which includes other errors and infractions, warrants his dismissal.
Obviously, for the discharge to be upheld, the last offense must
be proved.
This is a discharge case with the burden on the Company to
show, to the Arbitrator's satisfaction, that the grievant was at
fault, causing the damage to the negative film.

The standard of

proof required in such matters is well settled though variously
defined as "clear and convincing", or "by a preponderance of the

I
I
I
I

-2credible evidence", or by "substantial evidence."

In my view

.— _

all of these standards have the same requisites, namely that the
•

quantum and quality of the proof advanced and adduced by the

..- •
5,°"

I1

i

Company must be sufficiently probative and persuasive as to
satisfy the Arbitrator that the grievant committed the act
charged.

At least, in connection with offenses, as here, which

do not parallel a criminal charge (in which event this Arbitrator
tends to hold an employer to a higher standard but less than
'
-

-•»• ._

"beyond a reasonable doubt") there should be a showing of "compel
ling probability" that the employee involved was at fault or
committed the offense charged.

i

Therefore only to the extent that the standards of proof
in bailment or tort cases coincide with the foregoing, are those
standards applicable to a discharge case.

For it is noted that

in bailment and tort actions a defendant is liable only for
money damages if he has been negligent; whereas in the instant
case the grievant faces discharge, a more serious penalty.

•',£- •
^:--*:-.

The Company's case falls short of the requisite standards,
irrespective of which definition is applied.

The Company has not

proved, fully or even as a compelling probability that the
grievant was negligent.

It cannot show how the scratches occurred

It cannot point specifically to but rather speculates on what
the grievant did wrong that caused the damage.

The Company's

case has not foreclosed the reasonable possibility that the
scratches were due to machine malfunction or other operational
factors beyond the grievant's knowledge or fault.

This is not a

-3res Ipsa loqultor situation.

There are plausible explanations

for the damage other than negligence on the part of the grievantJ
The mere fact that the film was in the grievant's possession doea
not make him automatically liable for the damage.
absolute guarantor of the condition of the film.

He is not an
Rather, if

damage occurs, some actual or compellingly probable proximate
and causal relationship must be established between what the
grievant did and the damage.

That causal connection has not beer

shown.
The evidence on the grievant's alleged "admission against
interest", namely the Company's assertion that he admitted to his
foreman that he scratched the negative while taking it down, is
offsetting and inconclusive.

The foreman testified to that

"admission", but the grievant vigorously denied it.

While I

find no reason in the record why the foreman would falsify what
the grievant said, he may have been mistaken and there were no
other witnesses to the conversation.

One could conclude that

the grievant inspected the negative after taking it down, not
because that was his normal precautionary procedure, but rather
as an exception to his normal routine because he had done something wrong, thought he may have done some damage to the film,
and made the inspection to find out.

But on the other hand,

considering the grievant's prior record of errors and other
infractions and that he knew that future mistakes or negligence
would jeopardize his job, one could find it most doubtful for
him to have voluntarily and on his own initiative notified the

-4foreman that the negative was scratched, if he was responsible

--

for that damage.

And under that circumstance, it would be

equally doubtful that he would have acknowledged that he
caused the damage.
In sum, I conclude that the evidence on what the grievant
said to the foreman and its significance, is not sufficiently
unequivocal to sustain the discharge.

Or in other words, in

the absence of adequate evidence showing where and how the
grievant was negligent, his disputed statements to the foreman
are simply not enough to justify the imposition of the ultimate
penalty of discharge from the Company, and his probable loss of
employment in this industry.
However the record does disclose a serious failure on the
grievant's part which though not proved as the cause of damage,
is a serious enough violation of operating procedures to foreclose a full remedy.

The grievant ran his machine at a pro-

hibited high speed when taking the negative down and when
"piggy-backing" the second negative onto the first.

Though as

indicated a causal or contributory connection has not been made
between the speed of the machine and the damage, a disciplinary
suspension for that offense is manifestly warranted.
Based on the entire record before me, the Undersigned,
Permanent Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement
between the above named parties makes the following AWARD:

-5-
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The discharge of Shale Dworan is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall
be reinstated but without back pay, and
the period of time between his discharge
and his restoration to duty shall be deemed
a disciplinary suspension. He should note
that he has been given some benefit of the
evidentiary doubt in this case, and therefore
he is warned that future acts of negligence
on his part, other violations or misconduct,
would be grounds for his dismissal.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne equally
by the parties.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: May 10, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

.

On this tenth day of May, 1976 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

. ST^TL OF az*
He. 30l*;9725
jjiiliiii in KKJEI
Ittm Li:,11 KM* *».

October 12, 1976

In the matter of the arbitration
between
INTERIM OPINION
Local 702, IATSE and
of the
Cineffects Color Laboratories
permanent Arbitrator

In bhe instant case the Union contends that the reference to
"40 hours" in Article 29 (a) and 30 (a) of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement includes overtime, hours worked as well
as straight time hours worked up to 40 hours worked in a week,
for payment of Welfare and pension contributions to
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 )Pension Fund
and Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 702 Welfare Fund.
The Company does not dispute that contention. Therefore, in
this proceeding, there is no issue before the Arbitrator over
the interpretation of the foregoing contract provisions.
.,
pursuant to the foregoing, the Company has offered to make
payments to said Funds retroactive to May 1, 1975.<s*W JcU^^^fJ^^
The Undersigned, as permanent Arbitrator, refers the foregoing
Company offer to the Trustees of both Funds, and retains
jurisdiction pending wcrrd of action by the Trustees.

Per

Schmertz
tent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FIIM LABORATORIES

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local' 702, I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION AND AWARD

and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

6?

In my Award dated December 18, 1969 between the above
named parties I upheld the Union's grievance and directed that
"the complement of the Gevachrome machine shall be three (3) men.
The question now posed is how the machine should be operated if it runs continuously through regular meal and break periods
•
The Union contends that the Company must obtain another operator
to relieve any of the regular operators during meals or break
periods to ensure a three-man complement at all times.

The

Company contends that for meals and break periods the assigned
crew members should individually relieve each other, and that
the machine may be run during those periods with only two operators present.
My Award of December 18, 1969 does not deal explicitly with
the instant question, and the contract is silent on this particular problem.
The Union relies principally on "past practice", asserting
that the practice has been for each member of the crew to be
relieved for meals and break periods by an operator obtained from
outside the crew, and that when the machine operated through thos

-2•

periods'there were three operators present at all times.

The

Company disputes this "past practice", contending that until
recently the machine was shut down during meal and break periods
i
and that the dispute arose only recently when the Company decided
to operate the machine continuously through meal and break period c
as well as during regular operating hours.
The testimony on "past practice" is sharply conflicting,
offsetting and hence indeterminative of the issue presented.
The Union offered testimony that for some time the machine has
been operated through meal and break periods and that a fourth
operator was obtained from elsewhere to replace whichever member
of the regular crew was at a meal or taking a break. On the othe
hand the Company offered equally probative testimony that the
machine has been shut-down during meal and break periods; or that
there was not enough work to run the machine through the meal
period; or that occasionally if the machine ran through the meal
and break periods the regular three man crew remained on and the
Company paid overtime for work performed through those periods.
Accordingly, based on the testimony in the record, I am unable
to decide whether there was a consistent practice relevant to
the issue before me, and therefore I am unable to direct,
pursuant to Section 17(b), that the "present method of operation
.... . continue without change."
However I am persuaded that the issue may be resolved by
a logical, and proper, albeit inferential interpretation of my
Opinion accompanying the aforementioned Award of December 18, 19f

I

-3together with a practice that is undisputed.

In that case -the

Union sought manning comparability between the Gevachrome machine
-•

and developing machines #1, 2 and 3. In establishing manning
comparability between the Gevachrome machine and developing
machines fl, 2 and 3, I stated:
The Gevachrome machine is a color developing or processing machine with an attached
applicator. It is undisputed by the Company
that other color developing machines with
applicators in the Laboratory, namely developing machines #1, f2 and #3, are run with a
crew of three when one strand is developed and
with a crew of five for two strands. The testimony of Messrs. Vitello and Kaufman, of the
Union and Company respectively, coincide on
one crucial point, and that is that by agreement between the parties, color developing
machines with applicators are and have been
run with a crew of no less than three men.
As I see it the question before me is whether
this latter referred to agreement applies to
"the Gevachrome machine, on which the applicator
is utilized only infrequently. I conclude that
it does. (Emphasis added).
In other words, in that Opinion, I determined that the
manning of the Gevachrome machine should be the same as the
manning on developing machines #1, #2 and #3.

In the instant

case, there is one past practice which is undisputed, and that
is that developing machines #1, #2 and #3 operate through meal
and break periods and the operators of developing machines #1,
#2 and #3 relieve each other during those times, thereby reducing the complement on those machines by one member during those
periods. The import and intent of my prior Award was to treat
the Gevachrome machine and developing machines #1, 2 and 3

-4similarly for purposes of manning. To grant Che Union's

5

grievance in the instant case would be to change that similarity
i
by according the operators of the Gevachrome, and the Union on
their behalf, a greater right or benefit than has been extended
to the operators of developing machines #1,#2 and #3 by practice
and under my prior Award. As indicated, I find no contractual
s

or "past practice" basis to support a distinction between the
way the Gevachrome machine is operated continuously during meal
and break periods and the way machines $1, #2 and #3 are operated during similar periods. Therefore the similarity or "parity"
of manning which was established by my Award of December 18, 196
shall continue to obtain, and the manning of the Gevachrome
machine during meal and break periods shall be handled in the
same manner as has been done on developing machines #1, #2 and
#3.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, Permanent
Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between
the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said parties makes the following AWARD:
.

The Union's grievance is denied. When a
member of the three-man complement of the
Gevachrome machine takes a meal or break
period, he shall be relieved during those
periods by the remaining members of the
crew. The Company is not obligated to obtain
a replacement from another location.

-5The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by
the Union.

£"

J. Schmertz J
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: November 29, 1976
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )

X

On this twenty-ninth day of November, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

•S&SSR.
Qnillriit |n /»,«,„ cnn.t
T«» E«pi,« Utrt, 30 J97/
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GERALD SCHILIAN
COUNSELOR AT LAW

June -8, 1976

Mr. Eric Schmertz
••
.. , •
.
-....-•
122 East 42nd Street ,
•''."'-' ., : • -•' ; ; - :'. •' .-' . '
New York, New York '• ;:'...' ''•"'•. •' . '..-'. .;-<^ ; "- : .
..' Re:
^ • . .': '.'.- '

Matter of Arbitration between Local 702 '
and DuArt Film Laboratory ..' •. '•'. .. . ..

Dear Mr. Schmertz:

-..-•••:

* . ..;•••'•

The undersigned, as attorney for Motion Picture
Laboratory Technicians. Local 702 hereby demands, arbitration against DuArt Film Laboratories regarding the
following issue:
"Whether the employer is forcing employees
to run the gevert developer at times and under
circumstances which are improper and if so,
what shall the remedy be?"
•
' Would you be so kind as to schedule this matter
for hearing at your earliest convenience. .• . -.'..
Very truly yours,

C
cc:

.
Mr. C. W. Vitello
DuArt Film Laboratories

Gerald Schilian
- -"
. ,
•
. •. '

:

'

)
I

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FIIW LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between

Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702, IATSE

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Radiant-Technicolor Laboratory
The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated Article
16(e) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties in failing to pay
the proper wages to working foremen and
sub-foremen, and if so, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer on
September 2ti, 1970 ut which time representatives of the above
named Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath and the contract time

limit for rendition of the Award were waived.

The Employer and

Union filed post-hearing memoranda.
The pertinent part of Article 16(e) reads:
Working foremen and sub-foremen shall receive
no less than 10 percent above the highest base
rate in their respective departments
This case really involves deciding the meaning of "base
rate" In tlu.1 foregoing ArtJi-le.
addressed to that.

The Opinion nncl Award shall be

The Employer contend;; thai the base rate is

the schedule of rates for each of the groups and job classificar
i
tions set forth in Schedule A of the contract. The Union asserts

-2that the "base rate" is the actual compensation received.
For all purposes I do not: find the position of either
party to be correct, x^he term "base rate" is common in industrial
relations and has a traditional meaning.

It means the hourly

rate which an employee receives or which attaches to his job
classification, exclusive of such additional compensable items
as premium pay, fringe benefits, shift differentials, and
incentive earnings.^^I find nothing in this contract which endows the terminology "base rate" with any different or special interpretation.
I consider it irrelevant that employees receive overtime, holiday
yiny, v;ii-ai I tut p;iy, nick pay, severance unit liuroavcatent p-'iy
calculated on their actual compensation rather than on the rates
of pay set forth in Schedule A.

For it should be noted, not only

that these are additional items of compensation for each eligible
employee and not a formula for differential between an employee
and his foreman or sub-foreman, but that the contract provides
for the payment of holiday and vacation pay at an employee's
regular rate, and expressly provides for the inclusion of shift
premium.^/^he parties must have meant that there be a difference
between regular pay and base rate, because they used two different
terms, .^f am satisfied that the term regular pay means the actual
compensation an employee is receiving when he goes on vacation or
when a holiday falls, and the contract intends that during those
two periods of time he will be compensated as if he had been

-3working. The s.ame rationale and its irrelevance to Article 16(e)
•

applies to severance pay, bereavement und sick pay.
The Union asserts that the contract provides no definition
of "base rate." However the foregoing differentiation between
the contract use of "regular pay" and "base rate" together with
Article 4(c) impels a conclusion closer to the Employer's
interpretation than that of the Union.

In pertinent part Article

4(c) provides:
employees, if any, receiving wages
over the prior base rate of their respective classifications shall continue to
receive the same amount over the base rate
set forth in Schedule A, so long as they
remain in said classifications. (Emphasis added.)
In the absence of any ocher contract definition the foregoing juxtaposition of "base rate" and Schedule A, provides,
inferentially at least, a logical argument that Schedule A and
"base rate" are synonymous.

I recognize that Article 4(c) could

represent the use of Schedule A as the base rate under the specific
circumstances mentioned therein, and not for all purposes including the application of Article 16(e). Article A(c) does
provide for wages less than the scales of Schedule A for new
and inexperienced employees; the rates of Schedule A for new
and experienced employees; and for rates in excess of Schedule A
for thoM' who ti.-ul lu>on roci11 vlnt' •' hi)'.'1''1' v;ite.

Con fined to

those circumstances I would be inclined Lo agree with the Union
that Article 4(c) may not necessarily be interpretative of the
i
term "base rate" as found in Article 16(e). But frankly, I find

-4nothing else in the contract which supports the Union's unusual
view that base rate is synonymous with actual compensation, when
actual compensation includes premium pay, shift differentials,
merit increases and incentive earnings, and consequently I am
not persuaded that Article 4(c) should be so confined.
Therefore, based on the traditional interpretation of "base
rate"; the coincidence of "base rate" with Schedule A as set
forth in Article A(c); and in the absence of any other explicit
definition of the term, 1 must conclude that "base rates" are
more often, and probably most often, the rates found in Schedule
A of the contract.

"However it should be noted that Section

16(e)

refers to the "highest base rate in their respective departments",
not lIn; "hlf.liusi bii.sc rntc of n class I flt-.-U \ in their respect-

ive departments." /fo my mind this means llu»L the "highest base
*
\" referred to in Article 16(e) is^th
to and received by the highest paid employee supervised by a
foreman or sub-foreman in a particular department(s), not merely
the Schedule A rate attached to the classification of that
employee. /And therein lies the exceptions to the use of Schedule
A as the base rate for the application of Article 16(e).

For

example, an employee may have been hired at an hourly rate in
excess of the rate for that classification as set forth in
Schedule A.

In that event, thnt mnnlnvr^ wc-nld receive a base

rate different from ;md lusher than the •Kf-Ucdulx.'-A base rate.
And if his higher hourly rate was greater than others within the
i
department, that rate of pay would constitute the "highest base

-5rate in the respective department" within the meaning of Article
16(f), mill the supervising foreman and/or sub-foreman would be
entitled to be paid at least 10 percent higher.

In other words

as between the Schedule A rate for a job classification and a
higher hourly rate paid an employee working within that classification, the base rate for purposes of Article 16(e) would be
the latter.
Similarly if an incumbent employee is transferred from one
job classification to another, and upon assuming the latter is
paid an hourly rate in excess of the Schedule A rate for that
job classification, his higher hourly rate would be his "base
rate." And if that was the "highest base rate" in the department
Lt would be the basis upon which the ArLiclc 16(c) diffcrenLiai
for foremen and sub-foremen would be calculated.
xXrhere

may be other instances in which an employee's hourly

rate, exclusive of premium pay, fringe benefits, incentive earnings! and other special compensationjmight exceed the hourly rate
set forth in Schedule A.

The formula, as referred to in the above

examples, should be followed in those instances as well.
S
One specific question remains, and that is whether merit
increases serve to increase the hourly rate or base rate within
the meaning of the foregoing discussion. The record is not clear
us to wliciluT HUT It liicfi'iiiios arc red circled iuul se|Kiiral:cd from
an employee's hourly rate or base rate, or whether they arc
merged into his hourly rate causing an increase in that rate and,
by consequence, the establishment of a new and higher hourly rate.
«k

If the former is true a base rate would not include merit increase
If the latter is true, merit increases would have to be included

'

-6•

Ln the calculation of "the highest base rate."

That phase of

llic issue I leave to the parties for application and iniplementuciot
with their respective rights reserved to refer to me for specific
resolution disputes or questions arising therefrom.
One final point.

Though no evidence of the negotiation

history of Article 16(e) was introduced, I think it probable,
and agree with the Union, that the intent of Article 16 (e) was
to provide compensation for foreman and sub-foreman in excess of
the pay received by those they supervise.

1 would expect with

my ruling that the phrase "highest base rate" means the highest
actual hourly rate received by an employee whom a foreman or sub, many oC the possible Instances In which

subordinate employees would receive more money than their foreman
or sub-foreman, would be corrected. On the other hand if subordinate employees are earning more because of overtime payments,
shift differentials and incentive earnings, and if this frustrates
an intent of Article 16(e), it can only be cured by negotiations
and not arbitration.
Accordingly the Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
he phrase "highest base rate" In Article 16(e)
l the ronl rm-l mivnis llu1 hi Kite.•••(. actual hourly
rate paid to an employee in the department or
departments supervised by a working foreman and/
or sub-foreman. In most instances that "base rate"
will correspond with the rates of pay set forth in
Schedule A of the contract. However where an
i

-7employee is \hired at an hourly rate higher
than the Schedule A rate; transferred from
one classification to another and upon assuming the latter receives an hourly rate Mgher
than the Schedule A rate; or under other .similar
circumstances with the same result, the "base
f"Strep'shall Bethe higher rate. Because,"base
rate" is JLipited-Jbo the "hourly rate" "It does
not include incentive earnin^sV^remTum pay,
shift differentials or fringe benefits .^Whether
merit increases are to be included in or excluded
from the calculation of base pay is remanded to
the parties for interpretation and implementation
consistent with the foregoing OPINION.
The parties are directed to apply the foregoing
AWARD to the circumstances presented in the instant grievance, and to make adjustments, if any,
in the pay of foreman and/or sub-foremen under
Article 16(e) of the contract retroactive to the
date of the grievance.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared by the parties
equally.

Eric J. Schmertz
/Arbitrator
DATED: May 24, 1977
STATE OF: New York )ss
COUNTY OF:flawYork )
On this twenty fourth day of May, 1977, before me personall
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

VALERIE R. HANSEN
Notary Public. Sis', of N.w York
No. 3M5I9MI
Qualified in Nauau
Term iipim March 30,

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, J.A.T.S.E.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has breached the
contract by excluding a new employee
hired to perform plant clerical functions
in the Maintenance Department from the
bargaining unit. And if so, what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held on August 1, 1977 at which time

I!

representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded ful
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
For about ten years the clerical duties which are the
subject of this case were performed by a bargaining unit
employee classified as as Maintenance Mechanic B.

Those duti

constituted his principal straight time hours assignment.
I consider this extended and undisputed history of
how and by whom the work was performed, to be constructive
if not explicit acknowledgement

and acceptance by both sides

that those duties were within the contractual

jurisdiction

of the bargaining unit, and hence covered by Article 1 of the
contract.

Particularly so, as here, in the absence of any

-2specific job description.which does not include those duties
within that classification.
That other types of clerical duties elsewhere in the
laboratory have and are being performed by non-bargaining ur
employees is immaterial.

None of those situations had any

history-let alone such an extensive history-of

being perfoi

by a bargaining unit employee as a principal part of his
bargaining unit classification.
That the incumbent bargaining unit employee who
performed that work has now retired does not mean that the
work is lost to the unit, nor does it mean that the Company
may now unilaterally remove it from the unit and assign it t
a non-bargaining unit new hire.
bargaining unit assignment

Having ripened into a

for reasons previously stated,

it must remain so placed unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer has breached the contract
by excluding a new employee hired to
perform plant clerical functions in the
Maintenance Department from the bargainIng unit. The Company is_directed either
to include,.that employee within the bargaining unit at a rate of pay to be negotiated
by the parties, or to return the clerical
duties to the Maintenance Mechanic B
classification, or establish a new bargain-

-3-

ing unit job covering those duties
and negotiate with the Union the
wage rate for that job, which, in
my judgement, should be less than
vhat is paid a Maintenance Mechanic
B.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne
by the Employer.

Schmertz
Arb/trator

J

DATED: August 17, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventeenth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

i!

i
\
i!

& .

. _•_.__Lv^L-

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FIIW LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

-

OPINION AND AWARD

an8
r

Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Is the Employer in violation of the
Agreement by operating the Photomec
16nra color reversal process with a
crew of less than three? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A "quickie" arbitration hearing was held on August 15,
t which time representatives of the parties appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
On July 14, 1966, when the NOTE at the end of the
reference to Negative Developing Department in Schedule A of
the contract read as it presently reads, the then Industry
Arbitrator Joseph E. McMahon held (Case 702-66 Al) that develop
ment of color reversal film stock, then done on the Fako machin
was not "color negative developing" within the meaning of the
NOTE.

!i

In pertinent part he stated:
"The type of work performed by the Pako
machine is the crux of this dispute.
The machine processes color reversal film
stock.
"
the Pako machine does not fall
squarely within either the Positive or
Negative Developing Department."

^*s&es*aaa*!eia*aeiti£asai^^

-2"The note in Schedule A relating to
color negative developing, fixes the
crew-complement. That provision is
not binding here, in view of my prevr
ious determination that the Pako machine
does not come within the Negative Developing Department." (Underscoring supplied.)

:

He ruled therefore that a crew of three operators on
the Fako machine was not required by the contract, and that
the Employer could operate that machine and run the color
reversal development process with a crew of two.
Whether Mr. McMahon was correct is immaterial. His
Award is binding unless the parties by mutual agreement reject
or change it, or unless by contract negotiations or other agreement its effect is amended, changed or nullified.
None of this was done.

Following the McMahon Award,

no change, expansion or modification in the NOTE was made,
nor was there any other contract provision or agreement entered
into covering color reversal development.
So, the McMahon decision remains as the "definitive
word" on color reversal development performed onthe Pako
machine.
The issue before me involves color reversal development
on the Photomec machine.

Though the Photomec is different

from the Pako, the process or "type of work" (which Mr. McMahon
said was the "crux" of the earlier case) is still color reverse
development.

" w-,*.
'..-*.
. :-.
*•c- ,..-•- ---
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I fail to see how, in the face of the McMahon

ruling on the nature of the process of color

reversal develop-

-3ing, and in the absence of any subsequent contract provision
or any other agreement to deal with that process, I can now

-•V

hold that color reversal development on the Photoraec machine
is color negative developing within the meaning of the NOTE.
As I see it, the question still remains a matter for bargain
ing between the parties and not for arbitration.
Nor can I presently consider the question of the mam
of the Photomec machine on operational grounds.

As yet that

machine has not run enough to determine its complexities,
difficulties, and its demands on its operators.

It ran for •

short period in 1970, which obviously cannot be used as a
contemporary experience, and then again for only a few days
this month. The number and frequency of breaks, if any, the
physical, mental and other operating demands on the operator
assigned cannot yet be determined, and must await the passag
of a reasonable running time.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named part
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties makes the following AWARD:
The NOTE referred to in the contract
at the end of the reference to the
Negative Developing Department in
Schedule A does not apply to color
reversal developing performed by the
Photomec machine. That process is
not "Color Negative Developing" within
the meaning of the NOTE. Therefore the
Employer is not in violation of the Agreement
by operating the Photomec 16mm color reversal
process with a crew of less than three. It
may operate the machine with a crew of two.

-4-

The Arbitrator's fee shall be borned
by the Union.

ric^ZT. S
Eric^T.
Schmertz
Arbitrator
rbtftrato

DATED: August 17, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On the seventeenth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowled to me
that he executed the same.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE
OPINION AND AWARD
and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

At the first hearing on October 13, 1976 the parties
stipulated the issue as:
Whether the Employer violated Section 16(e)
of the collective bargaining agreement by
failing to .pay proper wages to John Gazaway,
and if so what shall be the remedy?
Thereafter, on May 24, 1977 I rendered an Opinion and
Award in the case between Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE and Radiant - Technicolor Laboratory.

That

Opinion and Award dealt with the calculation of pay for working
foremen and subforemen under Section 16(e) of the industry-wide
contract.
At the request of the Employer, the instant case was reopened and a second hearing held on August 1, 1977 at which, based
on the evidence and argument of the parties the issue was narrowed1
1

to whither the rates of pay for employees operating the New Eastmai

I

!

, Color Negative II Processor (F.CN II) under the separate agreement j
j
[
' between Local 702 and TXiArl d.itcd September 17, 1975 are "base
j
j rates" w i t h i n the meaning of n;y Opinion and Award in Radiant Technicolor.

(Presumably the parties felt that with a determina-

tion on that they would be able to claculate the pay of working

|

-2-

forcmati John Gazaway under Section 16(e)

of the contract and under

the formula established by my Award in Radiant - Technicolor.
However, that remains unclear because as the Employer (DuArt)
points out in its brief, the parties have yet to fully

litigate,

and T have not decided whether "merit increases" are part of "base
rates" within the meaning of Section 16(e), and also unlitigated
is the question, apparently involved in the instant case, of wheth
the pav of a working foreman may be compared with an employee with
in his Department but who works a different shift.)
In Radiant - Technicolor I stated inter alia:
"The parties must have meant that there be
a difference between regular pay and base
rate, because they used two different terms;"
and
"....I must conclude that "base rates" are
more often, and probably most often, the
rates found in Schedule A of the contract."
Though I pave some examples of circumstances under which
a "bape rate" would be higher than the rates set forth in Schedule
A, I stated that a base rate "does not include incentive earnings,
premium pay, shift differentials or fringe benefits."
In the instant case I do not find that the rates of pay
for the Color Wet Developer Type 3 and the Dry End Man Color Type
3 on the ECN II machine, as set forth in the agreement between the
parties of September 17, 1975, f i t w i t h i n the categories of ex-

,

ceptions to which I referred in Radiant - Technicolor.

!

Rather I

conclude th.ir the instant, ciispxitccl rates constitute Schedule A
"ba=e ralrs" plus a bonus of S.A5 and $.30 an hour respectively

;

-3when the machine is operated by a crew complement of two.
The separate agreement of September 17, 1975 uses the
phrase "special rate." As in Radinnt - Technicolor. I must conclude that the parties meant those rates to be different from the
"base rates" because they used a different identifying phrase.
Had they intended the rate for the two operators, made up of the.
Schedule A rate for a negative developing machine plus $.45 and
$.30 per hour respectively, to constitute the "base rate",
could and should have said so.

But they did not.

they

Instead they

referred to it as a "special rate", which in my judgement, meant a
base rate to which something else is added, in this case a bonus
or nn incentive of $.43 and $.30 per hour respectively, as a quid
pro quo for a willingness to run the machine with only two operators .
The ncmorandurr itself is also supportive of a conclusion
th.it Hie rates of pay are in txeess of a contractual "base r.ue."
It expres-ly provides for the circumstance under which the "special
rate" is ra -ire 1 lerj.

Sr leng ,i.c the machine is operated with a

rompltTicn: <'f two men I he special rate

is applicable, but when,

the mrvhhie is rur 01; n fv I i ni'ou;; has i s , the crevs' complement ' "
' h(. :; i r'.c':"i a^i'il I %> I ' i i l n ;• !'-:'ci <>;• J i v e in aci'Or'l.'inc't with

the

• ,nr J M i - '>)\ isi c'n> nl" ! In- '..••<;,->i i-'C ')c'vo lop) n.u Department as set '
. r'. li in ; h.- i c n ' i u ;, ,i!i'i i hi "spt-c- i a I rate" is cancelled.

'!'"

r-\ r-i)-!(i • i nt ~i an:- i!\'i u!:Jcr circumstances where the crew complc-<
mcnt coincides with the contractual manning requireirent for negative

•

•'•

--'•'. •

• •• -••- -• .•

.. ' . .

developing, the operators receive the Schedule A base rate.

When

the crew is reduced to two, those operators are paid more than
the base rate i.e. a bonus or an incentive for the extra work or
attention required by the reduction in complement.

Because thev

are demonstrably different, I am unable to conclude that the
higher "special rate" for two operators, and the lesser Schedule
A rate for a complement of three or five operators are both
synonymous with "base rate."
Because it is not certain that with this determination
Gazaway's pay can be calculated under Section 16(e), it is my
ruling that the Arbiteator's fee for this proceeding thus far be
shared equally by the parties.
AWARD
The "special rates" set forth in the
separate agreement between Local 702
and DuArt dated September 17, 1975 are
not "base rates" within the meaning of
Section 16(e) of the contract or my
Award in the Radiant-Technicolor case
dated May 24, 1977.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared
equally by the parties.

s

Errc J. SchmertK
Arbitrator

DATED: December 1, 1977
STATi: OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF Now York )

On this first day of December, 1977, before me persoml'v:
ramp and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to'
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and lie acknowledged to me that he executed the sane.

T.™

S (J

DU ART FILM LABORATORIES INC.
DU ART COLOR CORPORATION
245 WEST 55 ST. NEW YORK. N.Y. 10019
PHONE: (AREA CODE 212) PL 7-4580

September 17. 1975
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN DU ART FILM LABORATORIES, INC. AND MOTION
PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS LOCAL 702 I.A.T.S.E. CONCERNIKG
THE COMPLEMENT OF THE CREW FOR THE NEW EASTMAN COLOR NEGATIVE II
PROCESSOR AS INSTALLED BY DU ART FILM LABORATORIES. INC.:

This letter will serve as an Agreement between Du Art Film
Laboratories, Inc. and the Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E., Whereas Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc. has
installed the new Eastman Color Negative II (ECN II) process.
It is agreed that Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc. will pay a
special rate to the assigned personnel on this machine and will
pay an override pay per hour in the event other replacement
personnel are used on this machine when a two man complement is
used on this processor.
Classification - Color Vet Developer, Type 3 - Rate as outlined
in the current Contract under Schedule A plus .45 per hour.
Classification - Dry End Man Color, Type 3 - Rate as outlined
in current Contract under Schedule A plus .30 per hour.
It is our understanding that this processor will continue to
operate as it does now on a non continuous basis. This special
pay to the assigned personnel will remain in effect as long as
this type processor is operating with a complement of two men.

(Cont'd.)

- 2 In the event, however, that it becomes necessary to operate
this cachlne on a continuous basis, i.e., without interruption
for leader, etc., the foregoing Agreement re special rates is
cancelled, and the complement will be as specified in the
Collective Agreement.

Agreed To
vice President

Agreed To:
Chuck vitello, Business Agent
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

,
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ORLANDO TEMPLE

3

- v s -

4

TECHNICOLOR INC.,
RADIANT DIVISION

5

77 Civ. 2233

6

May 25, 1978

7
8
9
10
11

[In open court; jury present:]
C A R M E N

12

O L F F ,
THE COURT:

13

DIRECT EXAMINATION

14

BY MR. JACOBSON:

15

Q

resumed.

Mr. Jackson, continue.

[continued]

Mr. Olff, you were testifying yesterday about

16

having done certain work in the negative room that didn't

17

have production tickets attached to it. Did that work carry

18

identification of any kind?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

What type of identification?

21

A

Many times I worked on film that had Film

22
23
24
25

Chateau's
Q

identification.
Film Chateau.

Is that the company located

upstairs?
A

Correct.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
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11 bssr

Olff - cross/redirect

2

MR. ROSENFELD:

3

No further questions.

4

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

5

BY MR. JACOBSON.

6

Q

Roberto Cruz, Ismael Medina.

As far as you rcall, were all of the people

7

whose names you checked here on the afternoon shift with

8

Mr. Temple?

9
10

A

No. That is in all three shifts throughout

the lab.

11

Q

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

If I was to hand you a list of the balance

Of all the 110 to 130 employees?

14

of employees, the white employees, the 100 or so of them,

15

would you recognize all of thosa names and what shift

16

they were on?

17

A

No.

18

MR. JACOBSON:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE WITNESS:

21

No further questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Olff.
You are quite welcome.

[Witness excused.]

22

MR. JACOBSON:

23

THE COURT:

Plaintiff rests, your Honor.
Ladies and gentlemen, at this

24

time the plaintiff has rested, which means that he has

25

finished the presentation of their direct case, and I have

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
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12 bssr

2

legal matters of law I have to take up with the attorneys

3

as a result of that fact.

4

If you retire to tha jury room we will be

5

with you shortly.

6

(Jury excused.]

7

THE COURT:

8

Mr. Rosenfeld, I assume you want

to move to dismiss at the end of plaintiff's case.

9

MR. ROSENFELD:

10

THE COURT:

I do, your Honor.

I would like to have —

as I said

11

to both sides yesterday —

12

motion because I think there is a serious possibility of

13

my granting it and I therefore would like to have each

14
15

!

a complete argument on the

side present, as fully as it can, tha position which it
believes we are in at the moment.

16

MR. ROSENFELD:

17

THE COURT:

Shall I proceed?

Yes.

I think you will do yourself

18

the most good by getting to the heart of what the plain-

19

tiff has proved and not —

20

all doubts, as we must.

21

MR.ROSENFEFLD:

giving him the benefit of

Your Honor, plaintiff has the

22

burden at this point of establishing a prima facie case

23

of discrimination in the discharge of Mr. Temple.

24

THE COURT: Right.

25

MR. ROSENFELD:

Plaintiff is attainting to

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOIM-
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2

carry that burden by offering evidence of discrimination

3

in two areas, as I understand:

4

statements, and perhaps related conduct, by Mr. Stroud,

5

who was Mr. Temple's supervisor for the last two or three

6

weeks of Temple's employment only, and who didn't make

7

the decision to discharge Mr. Temple, and who had —
THE COURT:

8

The first area involves

I think a more accurate way of

9

saying it, is the record doesn't indicate who made the

10

decision, but there is no evidence that he did; merely

11

that he was pleased that it occurred.

' 12

MR. ROSENFELD:

The record has testimony that

13

on July -- on the night of July 1, when Mr. Temple got

14

back to the laboratory and Stroud

15

at the time clock, Stroud said "Elio said to dismiss

16

you. "

17

was waiting for them

The second area, as I understand plaintiff's

18

case, in which they are trying to carry their burden of

19

establishing discrimination on

20

Temple was required to punch out before lunch and punch

21

back in after lunch. This is alleged to be a singling

22

out on the ground of race.

23
24
25

this point is that Mr.

I think that plaintiff has succeeded in
neither of those two areas of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOI^r
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2

table and said here they are, the company nevertheless

3

knew or should have known the practice that was going on

4

in the plant of men taking 45 minutes or more for lunch.

5

If they used Mr.Temple's lateness as an excuse

6

for firing him, I think that's all it was was an excause

7

because they would have had to clean out the entire plant.

8

THE COURT:

9

I have really heard enough.

I understand that, Mr. Jacobson.
I am prepared

10

to consider the matter.

11

room and review the evidence myself with my law clerk,

12

and I will be with you shortly to let you know what my

13

conclusion is.

I want to retire to the robing

14

MR. ROSENFELD:

15

THE COURT:

16

I
i
Do you want the exhibits. Judge?

If I want any I will ask you for

them.

17

(Recess.)

18

(In open court; jury absent.)

19

THE COURT:

20
21

Gentlemen, I am ready to rule

on the motion.
I should point out that although I have taken a

22

short period of time since the end of argument, and have

23

considered some factors that I couldn't consider in open

24

court, in the sense that I have reviewed matters in my own

25

mind and in discussion with my clerk, that there was very

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHO' FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N Y . - 791-1020
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2
3
4
5
6

56-bsb
little testimony this morning, and I have, of course, been
aware of the fact that the motion was going to be made
this morning and I have reviewed in my mind the testimony
of the past days before the end of the argument this
morning

7
8
9
10

"l am prepared to grant the motion.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I am

aware of the fact that such a motion, that is, a motion
for a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiff's
case, requires the defendant to meet a high threshold.

11
12

....

I thoroughly understand the arguments made
by Mr. Temple's counsel, who have been complete and zealous
in their presentation of the case.

Nevertheless, I find

that the evidence establishes that the decision to discharge here was made by Mr. Pesato; that the witnesses
for the plaintiff

readily admitted that Mr. Pesato's

reputation with regard to race, racial matters, was good.
I don't doubt that Mr.Stroud had contemptible attitudes for
racial minorities, including

the minority of which I am

•

a member.
I don't doubt that Mr.Stroud was pleased when
Mr. Temple was discharged, but I find that the plaintiff
has not established or borne his burden to establish that
Mr. Stroud's authority was such as to have brought the
;

discharge about on his own.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COUR TH(
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7
8

(Pause.)
THE COURT:

1981 applies or not, although I must say that the recitation
given this morning by Mr. Schoolman and Mr. Rosenfeld
raises more doubts than I had thought might have existed.
(Jury present.)

10

(Jury discharged with the thanks of the Court.)

11

13
14

MR. JACOBSON:

17
18
19
20

Of course, Judge, I don't think

we have to put it on the record, but I will do so anyway.
We of course take exception to the ruling.
not necessary

15
16

Because of my determination of

course it becomes unnecessary to decide whether Section

9

12

-

simply advise them that the case has been concluded.

4

6

.•

58- bsb

3

5

-• • ^Irt

—

THE COURT:
understand.

vJhile it is

I would expect you to, and I

If you decide that you want to appeal the

verdict I would understand it.
I don't think there are any other motions that
are necessary at this time.

If there are, you are granted

whatever time you need to make them.

21
22
23
24
25

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOl'sr
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2
3
4

Moreover, and very much to the point, this
record is like a battlefield pockmarked with the shells
which have dropped as to Mr. Temple's own undependability.

5
6
7
8

Indeed, I was struck by the fact that half of
his testimony related to a narration of his own previous
offenses which had brought on discipline, not only in the
case of the defendant here, but of his previous employer.

9
10
11
12
13
14

Objective determiners of the facts in the past
have found that he was away from his post on numerous
occasions and he came perilously close to discharge at
Du Art on two occasions, and one has a right to infer that
the work habits which existed at Du Art were not substantially changed at Technicolor.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I share with all the people in this room a
sense of revulsion at matters involving discrimination of
race.

For whatever it is worth, I assure Mr. Temple

that had I for a moment believed that a jury here could
conscientiously decide in your favor, I would not have
ruled as I have.
For all the reasons I have stated, I direct
a verdict in this matter, in this case, in the defendant's
favor and I will now so advise the jury.
Call the jury, please.
I won't advise them of the result.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF LOCAL 702 AND V I T E L L O GRANTING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED JUNE 27, 1979
(pp. A163-A169)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHALE DWORAN,
Plaintiff,
-againstMOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS
LOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF
THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING
PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, An unincorporated
association, COSMO VITELLO, as President
of Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians,
Local 702, International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of the United
States and Canada, an unincorporated
association, and TECHNICOLOR, INC.,

78 Civ. 118KPNL)

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

Defendants.
On August 24, 1977 Shale Dworan was discharged
from his position with Technicolor, Inc. (the "Employer").
Dworan's union, Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local
702, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Operators of the United States and Canada
(the "Union") refused until February 1978 to demand arbitration
of Dworan's discharge. When the Union finally demanded arbitration, the employer refused. Dworan brought this action in
November 1978 against the Union, its President (Vitello)
and the Employer, alleging breaches of the Union's duty
of fair representation and two breaches of the collective
bargaining agreement on the Employer's part, discharge without
just cause and refusal to arbitrate.

S

_

.

A164
The Union and Vitello now move for summary judgment.
The uncontroverted facts are these:
Dworan was employed by the Employer at its plant
at 321 West 44th St., N.Y., N.Y. from 1971 until his discharge
in August 1977. Dworan was represented in his employment
by the Union.
The Employer had regularly complained to the Union
2

about Dworan's performance and behavior while he was employed.
The collective bargaining agreement between the
Employer and the Union provided for binding arbitration
following unsuccessful adjustment of "any dispute arising
under this contract."

2
In their answer the Union and Vitello alleged
Dworan had been the subject of "regular and continuous employer
complaints both with respect to his work performance and
his behavior." 1112. Ten 'negligence reports' concerning
Dworan, most of which show that they are addressed to a
Union representative, are annexed as part of Exhibit A to
the answer. Whether Dworan's affidavit in opposition to
the motion intends to controvert these allegations is unclear.
(See US of Dworan's affidavit dated November 20, 1978 in
opposition to Union Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.)
Dworan apparently contends these complaints or reports are
immaterial. But insofar as the Union is aware of them they
are certainly material to its assessment of the likelihood
of success at arbitration and thus to the questions of arbitrariness, capriciousness and lack of good faith, which are at
the heart of an action for unfair representation. See Vaca
v. Sipes infra. -Dworan's argument of immateriality is unpersuasive if not frivolous. When confronted with a motion for
summary judgment one cannot rest on mere conclusory denials.
S.E.C. v. Research Automation Corp, 585 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1978). Dworan's affidavit does so. For this reason I may
treat the allegations as uncontroverted.
In his deposition Dworan himself admitted the
Union had intervened on his behalf to resolve problems that
he had with management from eight to a dozen times. Dworan
deposition at 127.

.

. . ..
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In February 1976 Dworan was suspended pending
discharge for carelessness. Dworan filed a grievance
and his grievance was pursued by the Union to arbitration.
In May 1976 the arbitrator rendered his award, reinstating
Dworan without back pay and adding:
He [Dworan] should note that he has been
given some benefit of the doubt in this
case, and therefore he is warned that
future acts of negligence on his part,
other violations or misconduct, would
be grounds for his dismissal.
Exhibit B to Defendants Union and Vitello's Answer.
On August 4 or 5, 1977, Dworan was suspended
for taking an excessive coffee break, but at the Union's
instance was reinstated. (Dworan deposition at 119).
On August 24, 1977 Dworan was suspended pending
discharge for taking an excessive coffee break. The
next day representatives of the Union and the Employer
met with Dworan to discuss his discharge. Following
this meeting the union representative (Vitello) met
with Dworan. At this meeting Dworan insisted upon full
reinstatement without loss of pay. (Dworan deposition
at 29-30).'
Vitello then consulted with the Union's Shop
Steward and with the Union Vice-President to determine
On August 10, Dworan wrote Vitello, thanking
him for his efforts, "Dear Brother Vitello: Once again
I wish to thank you for your continued support and
invaluable assistance in the matter of my most recent
'suspension* at Technicolor Laboratories. ..." Exhibit
F to Defendants Union and Vitello's Answer.

A166
the validity_of Dworan's defense (a pervasive practice
of excessive coffee breaks) and was told there was
no practice of taking breaks of the length to which
Dworan had admitted (35 minutes). Vitello later consulted
with Union counsel Schilian, who advised Vitello that
there would be little chance of success at arbitration.
During this period, Vitello also approached the Employer
to propose reinstatement. The Employer was adamant.
Vitello concluded arbitration would not be appropriate
but Dworan was given the opportunity to appear before the
Union's Executive Board to present his case for decision.
Dworan met with the Executive Board September
9, 1977. The Board determined that arbitration was not advisable.
After Dworan won an unemployment insurance award
in October 1977, his lawyer requested the Union to reconsider
its decision not to demand arbitration. The Union's position
remained unchanged. However, Dworan's request for an opportunity
to appeal the original decision to a meeting of the Local's
general membership was granted.
In January, 1978 Dworan appeared before the membership,
which denied Dworan's request for reconsideration.
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In February 1978 Dworan appealed this decision
to an International body with which Local 702 is affiliated.
Counsel for the International then contacted the local Union's
counsel to ask whether something could be done to avoid
litigation. At counsel's urging Vitello agreed to demand
arbitration.
The Employer refused to arbitrate.

The essence of plaintiff's claim is that his.union
arbitrarily, capriciously and in bad faith delayed taking
4
his grievance to arbitration. An arbitrary, capricious
or bad faith refusal to process a grievance is a breach
of a union's duty of fair representation under the NLRA
cognizable in the federal courts. Vaca v. Sipes, 87 S. Ct.
903 (1967).
It may be argued (with support from case law
and commentators, see 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
1T56.16 at 56-668-669 and cases cited) that where motive
and intent are at issue, as when bad faith is alleged, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
X

Dworan claims a 1975 intra-union disciplinary
proceeding in which he was charged with making accusations
against fellow employees and which resulted in a $500 suspended
fine, left a residue of ill will against him. Dworan Affidavit
dated November 20, 1978 in opposition to Union Defendants'
motion for summary judgment at HU9, 15.

AI68
But the essential soundness of that proposition
does not mean that there are no limits to its appropriateness.
Where the uncontested record shows, as in this case, such
persuasive abundance of apparent justification for the Union's
refusal to demand arbitration, especially when coupled with
conceded evidence that the Union made efforts on the plaintiff's
behalf, both previously and in the instance called in question,
is it reasonable to withhold summary judgment because of
the theoretical possibility that the Union may have been
motivated by bias, rather than by the valid factors? Indeed,
when an admitted bad record and the correspondingly small
likelihood of success at arbitration makes the Union's refusal
so clearly objectively correct regardless of the motivation,
the further question arises whether bias, malice or other
motivation are even relevant. The correctness and justification
for the decision are not diminished by the presence of malice.
I conclude that, contrary to the usual rule, summary
judgment may be granted against a claim of a union's malicious
refusal to demand arbitration if the admitted facts demonstrate
with clarity that the decision is objectively justifiable
- all the more so when admitted facts show that the Union
expended efforts in reaching the decision.

>
Were this not so, the mere inclusion of a claim
of malice would require unions to incur expensive litigation

.

.

.
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for every refusal to demand arbitration, no matter
how clearly justified.
The Union and Vitello's motion for summary
judgment against the plaintiff is granted.
SO

O R D E R E D :

Dated: New York, New York
June ^,-7, 1979
Pierre N. Leval
U.S.D.J.

.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER D E N Y I N G P L A I N T I F F ' S M O T I O N FOR R E C O N S I D E R A T I O N
DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1979
(pp.;Al77-Al78)
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-nqainstMOTIOM PICTURE LABORATORY
TECHNICIANS LOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL
STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA, an
unincorporated association, COSMO
V1TELLO, as President of Motion
Pictures Laboratory Technicians,
Local 702, International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators
of the United States and Canada, an
unincorporated association, and
.\, INC.,

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Defendants.

Pierre N. Leval, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of this court's
order of June 29, 1979 granting summary judgment to the
defendant union. He contests the validity of various suspensions
and complaints on his record which were referred to in the
opinion-as an "admitted bad work record ...." Dworan v.
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
1181

Local 702, 78 Civ.

(op. at 6HS.D.N.Y. June 27, 1979.

A178

Plaintiff misconceives the significance of this reference.
It implied no finding as to the facts underlying any blemish
on che plaintiff's work record, but only a recognition of
the fact of numerous supensions and complaints. The use -v
of the word "admitted" did nnt mean that plaintiff admitted
having committed the infractions, but only that he did not
contest that those suspensions and complaints appeared on
*

his record. The union was entitled to give due weight to
the "face value" of the plaintiff's work record in assessing
the likelihood of success as a f.nctor in the decision
or not to demand arbitration.
The motion is denied.

SO

O R D E R E D :

Dated: September /(/, l
New York, Mew York

Pierre N. Leval

whether

